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Abstract
In this paper, we integrate fertility and educational choices into a scale-invariant model of directed
technological change with non-renewable natural resources, in order to reveal the interaction between
population dynamics, technological change, and natural resource depletion. In line with empirical
regularities, skill-biased technological change induces a decline in population growth and a transitory
increase in the depletion rate of natural resources. In the long-run, the depletion rate also declines
in the skill intensity. A decline in population growth is harmful for long-run productivity growth,
if R&D is subject to diminishing technological opportunities. The effectiveness of economic policies
aimed at sustained economic growth thus hinges on its impact on long-run population growth given
the sign of intertemporal spillovers in R&D with respect to existing technological knowledge. We
demonstrate that an increase in relative research productivities or an education subsidy enhances
long-run growth, if R&D is subject to diminishing technological opportunities, while an increase in
the teacher-student ratio is preferable in terms of positive intertemporal knowledge spillovers.
Keywords: OLG-Model, Endogenous Fertility, Directed Technological Change, Non-renewable Nat-
ural Resources
JEL: J13, O13, O41
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1. INTRODUCTION
In terms of exhaustible natural resources, a sufficiently high growth rate of productivity is a prerequisite
for sustained economic growth. Scale invariant growth models suggest that the long-run growth rate of
productivity depends positively on the population’s growth rate. As economic development is associ-
ated with declining fertility rates, the overall effect of productivity gains and declining fertility rates on
prospects of long-run growth seems to be all but clear. In other words, is productivity growth digging
its own grave through declining population growth rates and what does this imply for economic policies
aiming at sustained economic growth?
Recent decades have been characterized by skill-biased technical change, declining fertility rates and an
increasing depletion of natural resources. While each of these phenomena have been analyzed by different
strands of the literature, an integrated dynamic general equilibrium framework which allows to assess the
interaction between the aforementioned events is still missing in the literature. Arguably, the integration
of these features into a single framework makes the analysis not only more realistic, but it moreover deep-
ens our understanding with respect to the effectiveness of economic policies aimed at sustained economic
growth in view of exhaustible natural resources. The way in which population growth affects produc-
tivity growth depends on the existence of positive or negative intertemporal spillover effects in research
and development (R&D) with respect to existing technological knowledge. We thus argue that economic
policies have to take into account both their effect on population growth and the sign of spillover effects
in R&D. In our analysis we focus on the effects of two different shocks: (a) a change in relative research
productivities and (b) a change in the teacher-student ratio. While the former captures the relative dif-
ficulty in developing machines complementary to skilled labor relative to unskilled labor complementary
machines, i.e. the efficiency of the research infrastructure, the latter can be interpreted as a proxy for
schooling quality. We find that an increase in relative research productivities raises population growth
while an increase in schooling quality reduces fertility. Thus, both shocks exert diametrically opposed
effects on long-run growth. An increase in the relative research productivity of inventing skilled labor
complementary machines is conducive for long-run growth if R&D is subject to positive spillover effects
while an increase in schooling quality is advisable if research labs are subject to diminishing technological
opportunities. We demonstrate moreover that an education subsidy enhances long-run growth, if R&D
is subject to diminishing technological opportunities.
The economic framework we employ can be summarized as follows: We consider an economy with over-
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lapping generations populated by skilled and unskilled households who decide the number of children
they wish to raise and their educational attainment. Thus, the composition of the population in terms
of skilled and unskilled households is endogenous. The skilled wage premium generates differential fer-
tility between skilled and unskilled households, in the spirit of Galor and Mountford (2006), and de la
Croix and Doepke (2003), i.e. fertility is inversely related to wages and education. In consequence, the
skilled-unskilled population ratio and the skill bias of technological innovations are jointly determined in
equilibrium. In regards to the production side of our model, we look at a scale invariant growth model
of directed technological change, in line with Acemoglu (1998;2002), where the production of machines
is subject to a non-renewable natural resource as an essential input. We are thus able to analyze the
interaction between population dynamics, the skill bias of innovations, and natural resource depletion.
In order to guide the reader through the model, we present its structure graphically in Figure 1.
Figure 1 about here
In order to address the transition process, we have performed numerical experiments, because analytical
solutions to high dimensional non-linear systems of difference equations cannot be obtained. Moreover,
closed-form solutions are, due to the existence of heterogeneities and the endogeneity of labor supply, even
for the steady state difficult to obtain.1 Nevertheless, we are able to demonstrate the main arguments of
our theory in a qualitative way.
By integrating the interaction between skill-biased technological change, declining population growth
and resource depletion into a theoretical framework,2 our paper relates to the following three empirical
regularities and theoretical building blocks: (i) In the past sixty years, the relative supply of skilled labor
has increased sharply in the U.S. as well as in other industrialized countries. Moreover, and contrary to
the predictions of a neoclassical framework with concave production technologies, there has been a sharp
increase in the skilled wage premium since the 1970s. The standard explanation for this pattern is an
acceleration in the skill bias of capital-embodied technological change (Autor et al., 1998 and Hornstein
et al., 2005). (ii) At the same time, increasing demand for human capital and increasing wages can
1Note that this is not a particularity of our model, see for example the papers by Galor and Weil (2000), Galor and
Mountfort (2006), and de la Croix and Doepke (2003). Technically, this problem arises in any general equilibrium model
with endogenous labor supply and concave utility and production functions (for example RBC-models).
2Models of directed technical change have been applied in environmental economics by Andre and Smulders (2005), Di
Maria and Smulders (2004), Di Maria and van der Werf (2005), and Di Maria and Valente (2008). Di Maria and Smulders
(2004) analyze the effects of pollution while Andre and Smulders (2005) study a labor-resource economy. Di Maria and
Valente (2008) were likely the first who provide a micro-foundation of purely resource-augmenting technical progress.
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be seen as responsible for the decline in average fertility rates - an observation which constitutes one
of the major stylized facts that characterized the development process of industrialized countries (Galor
and Weil, 1996; 2000).3 The economic channel which links increasing demand for human capital to
declining fertility rates works through a trade-off between the number of children that parents wish to
raise and the amount of resources they spend on eduction per child (see for example de la Croix and
Doepke 2003).4 Our work is also related to He (2012), who quantitatively analyses the question of
whether technological change or demographic transition drives the skill wage premium. In He’s work,
schooling choice is endogenous but investment-specific technological change and demographic change are
exogenous forces. It has been reported that technological change drives the skill wage premium while the
role of demographic change is limited. Our paper complements these findings in the sense that skill-biased
technological change drives the skilled wage premium, in addition, however, there is a general equilibrium
effect of the skill-wage premium on the demographic transition through the parental incentives to invest
in skills for their offspring.5 (iii) In 2007, OECD petroleum consumption amounted to 57% of the world
petroleum consumption (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2008) and per capita energy use differs
between the richest and the poorest group of countries by a factor ten (Weil, 2005). In addition, the world
depletion rate of crude oil was increasing continuously from roughly 0.03 between 1945 and 1960 to around
0.18 between 1991 and 2002 (Weil, 2005 and own calculations), where OECD petroleum consumption
increased by a factor greater than two between 1960 and 2005 (U.S. Energy Information Administration,
2006). This piece of evidence points to the notion that economic development comes with - at least during
the transition - declining fertility rates and an increasing depletion rate of natural resources.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the optimization problem
of households. Section 3 describes the production side of the model. Section 4 presents the equilibrium
structure and the dynamic system. Section 5 describes the long-run equilibrium. In Section 6, we calibrate
the model and explore its dynamic behavior. Section 7 provides a discussion of policy implications and
finally, Section 8 summarizes and concludes.
3For a comprehensive overview of aspects of the demographic transition, see Galor (2005) and Lee (2003). For the
emergence of lowest-low fertility rates in Europe, see Kohler et al. (2002).
4Given a high intergenerational persistence, fertility decisions and investments in education per child are transferred from
one generation to another and interact with macroeconomic aggregates. For empirical and theoretical evidence, see Kremer
and Chen (2000); Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980); de la Croix and Doepke (2003,2004). For a more detailed discussion see
Scha¨fer and Valente (2011).
5Similar Guvenen and Kuruscu (2012) find that an increase in skill-biased technical change increases overall wage
inequality both in the short and in the long run. Moreover He and Liu (2012) develop a unified framework where the
dynamics of skill accumulation and wage inequality arise as an equilibrium outcome in view of investment-specific technical
change.
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2. HOUSEHOLDS
We consider two groups of households: skilled and unskilled. Households bear children and make decisions
regarding the educational attainment of their offspring. In accordance with empirical observations re-
porting a high intergenerational persistence in education, we assume that the group of skilled households
raises skilled offspring only, while unskilled parents raise either unskilled or skilled offspring.6 The frac-
tion of unskilled households raising skilled offspring will be determined in equilibrium. Hence, there exist
three types of agents, skilled households raising skilled offspring, unskilled households raising unskilled
offspring, and unskilled households raising skilled offspring.
2.1 Preferences and Budget Constraints
The economy under consideration is populated by a continuum of overlapping generations composed of
skilled and and unskilled households, denoted by Lit (i = u, s), respectively. Time is discrete, indexed by
t, and ranges from 0 to ∞. Households live for three periods: childhood, adulthood, and old age. All
economically relevant decisions are made in the second period of life, adulthood. Adult agents supply
one unit of work time inelastically to firms, earn a wage income, wit (i = u, s), raise children and save.
Old agents consume their savings. Moreover, there exist two types of children trained to be either skilled
workers or unskilled workers in t + 1, denoted by ni,jt , j = u, s. Preferences of a member i = u, s of
generation t that is born in t − 1 are defined over consumption in t and t + 1 denoted by ct and ct+1,
repsectively, as well as the potential aggregate income of her children, wjt+1n
i,j
t . Preferences are specified
as
uit = ln c
i
t + ν ln(w
j
t+1n
i,j
t ) + ρ ln c
i
t+1, (1)
where potential income of an individual’s offspring is weighted by the altruism factor ν and ρ represents as
usual the individual discount factor of future consumption. We denote the fraction of unskilled households
investing in education for their children by θt ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, the two population groups evolve according
to
Lst+1 = θtn
u,s
t L
u
t + n
s,s
t L
s
t (2)
6Downward mobility and discrimination among offspring with respect to educational choices are absent as we focus on
developed economies with low fertility rates, which makes the emergence of the former and latter unlikely. We discuss this
assumption more in detail at the end of this subsection.
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and
Lut+1 = (1− θt)n
u,u
t L
u
t . (3)
The educational system is privately funded. As teaching requires skilled labor, LE,st , schooling fees depend
on the wage rate for skilled labor, wst , and the exogenously fixed teacher-student ratio, φ,
7 which reflects
in a broader sense the quality of the schooling sector. Moreover, the education sector is subject to a
non-deficit condition such that tuition fees must equal the wage sum of teachers
wstφ(n
s,s
t L
s
t + n
u,s
t θtL
u
t ) = w
s
tL
E,s
t . (4)
Consequently, the cost to educate a child amount to wstφ. Regardless of the type of children parents
wish to raise, fertility is subject to forgone wage earnings in terms of opportunity costs and consumption
needs of children. To this end, parents must relinquish the fraction z of their wage income per child.
Therefore, child-rearing costs for unskilled children amount to zwitn
i,u
t with i = u because only unskilled
households raise unskilled offspring. On the other hand, total child-rearing costs for skilled offspring
amount to (zwit + w
s
tφ)n
i,s
t , with i = u, s.
In order to finance old age consumption, members of generation t can buy property rights on natural
resources (natural capital) and invest in the capital market (man-made capital). We denote the stock of
the exhaustible natural resource in period t by Mt
8, and its extraction allocated to production by Rt.
The economy is initially endowed with a resource stock M0 > 0. At the beginning of the current period,
t, the stock of exhaustible natural resources is determined by the past resource stock minus extraction
in the current period, hence, Mt = Mt−1 − Rt. Each member of generation t buys m
i
t units of natural
resources from the old age generation at the competitive price pRt (in units of the consumption good).
In t+ 1, the level of old age consumption equals revenues from investments in man-made capital on the
capital market ((1 + rt+1)s
i
t), plus the selling of the property rights to natural resources to the adult
cohort born in t (pRt+1m
i
t), hence
cit+1 = (1 + rt+1)s
i
t + p
R
t+1m
i
t, with i = u, s. (5)
Thus, the budget constraints for skilled households raising skilled offspring (i, j = s), for unskilled
households raising unskilled offspring, (i, j = u), and for unskilled households raising skilled offspring,
7For similar assumptions regarding the schooling sector see Eicher (1996,1999), and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1977).
8We denote aggregate levels in capital letters and per capita levels in lower case letters.
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(i = u and j = s) read as
wst ≥ zw
s
tn
s,s
t + w
s
tφn
s,s
t + c
s
t + p
R
t m
s
t + s
s
t , (6)
wut ≥ zw
u
t n
u,u
t + c
u
t + p
R
t m
u
t + s
u
t , (7)
wut ≥ (zw
u
t + φw
s
t )n
u,s
t + c
u
t + p
R
t m
u
t + s
u
t . (8)
2.2 Optimization
A member i = u, s of generation t chooses {cit, n
i,j
t , c
i
t+1, s
i
t,m
i
t} in order to maximize the utility function
given by Eq. (1), with j = s, if i = s and j = u, s, if i = u. The maximization of lifetime utility
with respect to natural resources (mit) and investment in the capital market (s
i
t) implies a non-arbitrage
condition between the two assets known as Hotelling’s rule
1 + rt+1 =
pRt+1
pRt
. (9)
Hence, the marginal return of investment in the exhaustible resource stock,
pRt+1
pRt
, must equal the marginal
return of investment in the capital market used to finance research and development (R&D). The respec-
tive levels of consumption and savings are obtained from the maximization of (1) subject to either (6),
(7) or (8) as
cit =
1
1 + ν + ρ
wit, (10)
sit =
ρ
1 + ν + ρ
wit − p
R
t m
i
t, (11)
with i = u, s.
When wut < w
s
t , unskilled households have fewer resources available for present and future consumption.
Skilled households raise only skilled offspring and maximize (1) subject to (6) implying that
ns,st =
ν
(1 + ν + ρ)(z + φ)
. (12)
Thus, ns,st depends negatively on the child-rearing cost parameter, z, and the student-teacher ratio, φ,
which steers the educational cost per child. Unskilled households raising unskilled offspring, maximize
(1) subject to (7), implying that
nu,ut =
ν
(1 + ν + ρ)z
. (13)
A comparison between (12) and (13) shows that skilled parents raise fewer children than unskilled parents.
Unskilled households raising skilled offspring maximize lifetime utility (1) subject to (8), such that
nu,st =
ν
(1 + ν + ρ)
wut
(wut z + w
s
tφ)
=
ν
(1 + ν + ρ)
1
(z + w˜tφ)
, with w˜t =
wst
wut
.9 (14)
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As an increase in w˜t reflects higher educational cost per child compared to the wage income of an unskilled
household, nu,st is adversely affected by the skilled wage premium w˜t.
2.3 The Share of Unskilled Households Raising Skilled Offspring
The fraction of unskilled households raising skilled offspring is denoted by θt ∈ [0, 1]. For θt > 0, lifetime
utility (1) of unskilled parents raising skilled offspring must at least equal lifetime utility of unskilled
parents raising unskilled offspring. In light of the solution to the optimization problem of unskilled
households (10), (11), (13) and (14), it follows that the group of unskilled households raises both types
of children, i.e. nu,st > 0 and n
u,u
t > 0, if u
u,u
t = u
u,s
t , such that
10
wst+1
wut+1
= w˜t+1 =
z + w˜tφ
z
. (15)
Relation (15) is an indifference condition which will determine θt in equilibrium. Intuitively, as parents
are altruistic in respect to their offspring’s aggregate potential labor income, w˜t+1 must equal the cost
ratio of raising skilled or unskilled children. As the right-hand side of (15) is greater than one, it follows
that (15) holds only if wst+1 > w
u
t+1. Now comparing the respective fertility decisions implies
nu,ut > n
s,s
t > n
u,s
t , (16)
given that (15) holds.11 The number of unskilled children born in unskilled households, nu,ut , is the highest
since no resources are allocated to education. On the other hand, the fertility of unskilled households
raising skilled offspring, nu,st , is the lowest because they trade a lower number of children against a higher
income for their offspring. At this point it is also worthwhile to note that the absence of downward
mobility for skilled households is not as restrictive as it seems. Skilled parents are indifferent between
raising skilled or unskilled offspring if the skilled wage premium of the subsequent period is at least equal
to (z + φ)/z, which is smaller than the necessary skilled wage premium implied by (15). Thus, skilled
parents always invest in human capital for their offspring if (15) holds.12
9In order to ease the notation of the paper, we indicate an s/u-ratio between to variables qs and qu by q˜ = qs/qu.
10The proof follows directly from (10),(11), and (13),(14) given that: uu,ut = u
u,s
t .
11Similar to de la Croix and Doepke (2003), fertility differentials are generated by wage differentials. The difference is
that de la Croix and Doepke consider a continuous wage distribution.
12Downward mobility would be a problem if human capital investments were subject to capital market discrimination
in the sense that the interest rate of borrowers exceeds the equilibrium interest rate as in Galor and Zeira (1993). There,
downward mobility is a transitory phenomenon whose extent depends on initial inequality and the size of the gap between
interest rates. Moreover, downward mobility applies only to unskilled households that decided to invest in human capital
but never for skilled dynasties who never borrow on the capital market. A scenario characterized by a wage differential
below (z + φ)/z could arise in earlier stages of economic development, but this would over-stress our R&D-based theory.
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3. PRODUCTION
Final output, Yt, is composed of two intermediates, Y
s
t and Y
u
t , stemming from two different production
processes: one using skilled labor, LY,st , and the other one using unskilled labor, L
Y,u
t . This assumption
accounts for different skill-intensities and a low inter-sectoral mobility of skilled and unskilled labor. More-
over, each sector produces with a set of horizontally differentiated machines which are complementary to
each type of labor. The production of machines, in turn, requires the existence of technological knowledge
(a blueprint or design) and natural resources. Blueprints are the outcome of purposeful investments in
research and development (R&D).
3.1 Final Good Production
The elasticity of substitution between Y st and Y
u
t is determined by ε ∈ (0,∞) such that the production
of final output is subject to the following nested CES-production function
Yt =
[
γ(Y ut )
ε−1
ε + (1− γ)(Y st )
ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
. (17)
The parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) is a distribution parameter which determines how important the two goods are
for aggregate output. In each period the price of final output is normalized to 1, i.e. pt ≡ 1, where the
prices of Y st and Y
u
t are denoted by p
Y,s
t and p
Y,u
t , such that
[
γε(pY,ut )
1−ε + (1− γ)ε(pY,st )
1−ε
] 1
1−ε
= pt =
1.13
3.2 Production of Intermediates and Machines
The production of Y st and Y
u
t requires skilled and unskilled labor, L
Y,i
t , i = s, u, as well as a range of
labor complementary machines. The quantity of a machine of type l is denoted by xit(l), i = s, u. In
each period of time, t, there are N it different types of machines available. Production functions of both
intermediates read as
Y it =
1
1− β
∫ Nit
0
xit(l)
1−βdl (LY,it )
β , (18)
with 0 < β < 1 and i = u, s.
Machines of type l, xit(l), are manufactured with natural resources, R
x,i
t (l), i = u, s. Moreover, we assume
that current technological knowledge in sector i = u, s reflected by N it increases factor productivity in
13For details see Appendix B.1.
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the machine producing sector.14 Therefore, production functions for a machine of type l in sector s or u
read as
xit(l) = G
iN itR
x,i
t (l), G
i > 0, (19)
where Gi is a scaling parameter which takes the value Gi = A, if i = s and Gi = B, if i = u with
A,B > 0.
3.3 Research and Development
R&D constitutes the search for new designs (blueprints) of machines. To this end, research firms rent labor
services, capital inputs, and natural resources while taking the current level of technological knowledge
as given. It simplifies the analysis considerably, however, if we assume that all the three of these factors
combine to produce blueprints in exactly the same way that they combine to produce final output, i.e.
we apply the so called lab-equipment approach.15 As one period encompasses approximately 30 years,
we assume that blueprints are depreciated entirely after one period.16 Both R&D sectors generate new
blueprints according to the following scale invariant production functions
Nst+1 =
ηs
(Nst )
δ
(Dst ) and N
u
t+1 =
ηu
(Nut )
δ
(Dut ), (20)
where Dst and D
u
t are spending on R&D (in units of the final good) for skilled- and unskilled-labor
complementary types of machines, respectively. The parameters ηs and ηu are productivity parameters
that allow the cost of innovation to differ. Finally, we will distinguish between the cases δ > 0 and
δ < 0. In the former, technological advances are partially hedged out by diminishing technological
opportunities (Evenson, 1984; Kortum, 1993; Jones and Williams, 2000), when it may become more and
more complicated to achieve productivity gains. In the case of δ < 0, there are intertemporal knowledge
spillovers - a case which is labeled ”standing on the shoulders of giants” in the literature.
14It is debatable whether this assumption induces an over-optimistic perspective with respect to non-reproducible capital
into the model, but it is necessary to generate steady-state growth. If this effect were absent or weaker, marginal production
cost of machines would be, contrary to Acemoglu (2002), increasing over time since the price per unit of natural resources,
pRt , increases with the depletion of natural resources. Hence, operating profits of machine producers would approach zero
in the long-run (see also Eq. (22)) which would undermine the incentives to invest in R&D within finite time.
15By doing so, we also take into account the criticism stressed by resource economists with respect to the so-called
”knowledge driven” specification in which (skilled) labor is the only input to R&D and its therefore seemingly overly
optimistic assumption that R&D could take place without natural resources.
16As in our case, complete depreciation is a common assumption in OLG models of the Diamond type with natural
resources in order to assure analytical tractability. Without complete depreciation, the old generation would sell its assets
on the capital market to the adult cohort. The latter would split up their savings between existing blueprints and investments
in R&D. Under full depreciation the amount of savings is entirely allocated to R&D.
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4. EQUILIBRIUM
We denote the amount of natural resources allocated to machine production in sector i = s, u by
Rx,it =
∫ Nit
0
Rx,it (l) dl such that in equilibrium an efficient use of extracted natural resources requires
Rx,st + R
x,u
t = ϕ
x,u
t Rt + ϕ
x,s
t Rt = Rt with ϕ
x,u
t + ϕ
x,s
t = 1, and ϕ
x,i
t , i = s, u representing the
share of extracted natural resources allocated to sector s or u. Full employment of labor requires
Lst = L
Y,s
t + L
E,s
t and L
u
t = L
Y,u
t . In addition, an equilibrium consists of a sequence of quantities
{N it , Yt, Y
i
t , Rt, x(l)
i
t, L
i
t, L
Y,i
t , L
E,s
t , s
i
t,m
i
t, c
i
t, n
i,j
t }
∞
t=0, shares {θt, τt, ϕ
R,i
t }
∞
t=0 with τt denoting the deple-
tion rate of natural resources, and prices {wit, p
R
t , rt, p
Y,i
t , p(l)
x,i
t }
∞
t=0, where p(l)
x,i
t represents the price of
a machine, x, of type l in sector i, with i, j = s, u. The usual characteristics of a symmetric equilibrium
imply equal prices, px,it , and quantities, x
i
t, for each type of machine, l, such that p(l)
x,i
t = p
x,i
t , and
x(l)it = x
i
t. Machine producers maximize profits pi
x,i
t = [p
x,i
t − c
x,i
t ]x
i
t, where marginal production costs
amount to cx,it =
pRt
GiNit
, with i = u, s. In order to ease the notation we denote the ratio of two variables
ha and hb by h˜, i.e. h˜ = ha/hb. Perfect competition on goods and factor markets and monopolistic
competition for machine producers imply in equilibrium for periods t = 0, 1, ...,∞:
Lemma 1
(i) Demand for machines of type l is obtained from (18) in light of profit maximizing behavior of
intermediate producers
xit =
(
pY,it
px,it
) 1
β
LY,it , i = s, u. (21)
Machine producers take (21) as given and maximize profits, pix,it = [p
x,i
t − c
x,i
t ]x
i
t, if p
x,i
t =
cx,it
1−β =
pRt
(1−β)GiNit
, such that
pix,it = β(1− β)
1−β
β (pY,it )
1
βLY
i
t (c
x,i
t )
β−1
β , i = s, u.17 (22)
Moreover, the level of intermediates (18) then reads
Y it = (1− β)
1−2β
β N it
(
pt
Y,i
cx,it
) 1−β
β
LY,it , i = s, u. (23)
(ii) Profit maximizing behavior in final good production, together with (17) and (23), determines the
relative price of the two intermediates p˜Yt =
pY,st
pY,ut
as
p˜Yt =
1− γ
γ
(Y˜t)
− 1
ε =
(
1− γ
γ
) βε
σ
(N˜tL˜
Y
t )
−
β
σ (c˜xt )
1−β
σ , (24)
17As has been emphasized before, marginal production cost, cx,it , affects operating profits of machine producers adversely,
while the increase in cx,it caused by p
R
t is counteracted by the increase in technological knowledge.
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with σ ≡ ε− (ε− 1)(1− β).
In light of Lemma 1, we can specify the skilled wage premium, w˜t, the allocation of skilled labor
(LY,st , L
E,s
t ), and the allocation of extracted natural resources, ϕ
x,i
t (i = s, u), which are summarized
in the following proposition:
Proposition 1
(i) The skilled wage premium w˜t =
wst
wut
= ∂Y
s
∂LY,st
/ ∂Y
u
∂LY,ut
reads in light of (24) and (23) as
w˜t = [(1− γ)/γ]
ε
σ (A/B)
(σ−1)(1−β)
σβ (N˜t)
σ−1
σβ (L˜Yt )
− 1
σ , (25)
with N˜t =
Nst
Nut
and L˜Yt =
LY,st
LY,ut
. Furthermore, the equilibrium allocation of labor requires full
employment, such that LY,st = L
s
t − L
E,s
t and L
Y,u
t = L
u
t .
(ii) Given the student-teacher ratio, φ, demand for labor in the education sector is determined by the
total number of children sent to school: LE,st = φ(n
s,sLst + θtn
u,s
t L
u
t ). Given L
Y,s
t = L
s
t −L
E,s
t , the
skilled-unskilled employment ratio, L˜Yt , reads therefore as
L˜Yt = (1− φn
s,s)L˜t − φθtn
u,s
t , with L˜t =
Lst
Lut
. (26)
(iii) The shares of extracted natural resources allocated to the s- or u-sector, ϕx,it , i = s, u, are driven
by the blueprint ratio, N˜t, the skilled-unskilled employment ratio, L˜
Y
t , and the ratio of marginal
production costs of machines, c˜xt , such that
Rx,ut =
ϕx,ut︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
1 + ((1− γ)/γ)
ε
σ (N˜t)
σ−1
σ (L˜Yt )
σ−1
σ (c˜xt )
(σ−1)(β−1)
σβ
Rt (27)
Rx,st =
((1− γ)/γ)
ε
σ (N˜t)
σ−1
σ (L˜Yt )
σ−1
σ (c˜xt )
(σ−1)(β−1)
σβ
1 + ((1− γ)/γ)
ε
σ (N˜t)
σ−1
σ (L˜Yt )
σ−1
σ (c˜xt )
(σ−1)(β−1)
σβ︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−ϕx,ut =ϕ
x,s
t
Rt (28)
with Rx,ut +R
x,s
t = Rt.
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If σ > 1 then ε > 1 (see Lemma 1, item (ii)), such that the two intermediates Y ut and Y
s
t are gross
substitutes. In this case, item (i) of Proposition 1 indicates that the skilled wage premium, w˜t, is increasing
in the blueprint ratio, N˜t. In contrast, for a given N˜t, the relative factor reward of skilled labor declines
in the current skilled-unskilled employment ratio, L˜Yt , since labor is subject to diminishing marginal
returns. According to item (ii), the employment ratio of skilled and unskilled labor in production, L˜Yt ,
18A proof can be found in Appendix A.1.
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increases in L˜t but declines in the amount of skilled labor allocated to the education sector. Moreover, if
σ > 1, an increase in L˜Yt raises the relative market size of skilled labor complementary machines which
increases their marginal productivity in intermediate production and thus relative demand for machines,
x˜t.
19 Consequently, the share of extracted natural resources allocated to the s-sector, ϕx,st (see item
(iii)), increases as well. A symmetric argument holds for an increase in the blueprint ratio, N˜t. On the
other hand, an increase in the relative production cost ratio, c˜xt , reduces relative demand for skilled labor
complementary machines and increases the share of extracted natural resources allocated to the u-sector,
ϕx,ut . The evolution of the blueprint ratio will depend likewise on σ ≷ 1. More specifically, an expected
increase in the employment ratio of skilled and unskilled labor L˜Yt+1 will increase the profitability of
skilled-labor complementary innovations by means of the market size effect and will bias technological
progress towards the s-sector, whenever σ > 1, we come back to this point further below. In order to
match our model to empirical observations regarding the features of directed technological change, we
will assume that σ > 1 throughout the paper. 20
We now turn to the capital market and the depletion rate of natural resources, τ . In both R&D-sectors,
free entry drives profits down to zero. The value of each blueprint equals the discounted profit stream
(i.e. pix,it+1/(1 + rt+1)) generated by patent owners, that is, machine producers. On the other hand, Eq.
(20) implies that the marginal productivity of one unit of final output allocated to R&D equals ηi(N it )
−δ.
As pt has been normalized to 1, the technology market clearing condition reads as
p˜ixt+1 = η˜(N˜t)
−δ, (29)
such that the evolution of the blueprint ratio in the subsequent period is obtained from (22) and (24)
as21
N˜t+1 =
[
η˜σβ ((1− γ)/γ)
εβ
(A/B)(σ−1)(1−β)N˜−δσβt (L˜
Y
t+1)
(σ−1)β
] 1
β−(1−β)(σ−1)
, (30)
where β − (σ − 1)(1− β) > 0 within the range of plausible parameter values.
An increase in the future skilled-unskilled employment ratio, L˜Yt+1, induces an increase in the next period’s
blueprint ratio, N˜t+1, if σ > 1. Thus, innovations are biased towards skilled labor complementary
innovations if it is expected that next period’s skilled-unskilled labor ratio increases. An increase in A/B
19Eq. (21) implies x˜t =
(
p˜Yt
p˜xt
) 1
β
L˜Yt , i = s, u.
20If σ = 1, relative market size effects are absent and ϕx,it , i = u, s are time invariant, i.e. ϕ
x,u
t = γ and ϕ
x,s
t = 1− γ for
all t. Moreover, directed technological change requires σ > 1.
21For details see Appendix B.3.
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enhances the efficiency of natural resources in the production of machines in sector s relative to sector u,
such that relative marginal production cost, c˜xt , shrink. Consequently, the relative profitability of skilled
labor complementary innovations, p˜it+1, and the skill bias of future innovations reflected by N˜t+1 increase.
If δ > 0, the number of existing blueprints, N˜t, dampens the speed of innovations in the future because
it is comparatively difficult to innovate skill-complementary machines for the next period. For δ < 0, in
contrast, the existing level of blueprints speeds up innovations due to positive intertemporal knowledge
spillovers.
Outlays for R&D are financed by aggregate savings, St, which are not invested in ownership of natural
resources, implying that the amount of aggregate savings can be written as22
St = p
Y,u
t Y
u
t
{
ρ
1 + γ + ρ
β
[
1 + w˜tL˜t
]
−
1− β
ϕx,ut
1− τt
τt
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ZSt
. (31)
Free entry in R&D and perfect capital markets imply equality between future aggregate profits and
revenues of aggregate savings allocated to R&D-sector u or s such that N it+1pi
i
t+1 = (1 + rt+1)D
i
t. Thus,
we obtain from the technology market clearing condition (29), given that Dst +D
u
t = St:
Dut =
1
1 + Ωt
St and D
s
t =
Ωt
1 + Ωt
St, (32)
with Ωt = N˜t+1η˜
−1(N˜t)
δ = N˜t+1p˜i
x
t+1 and N˜t+1 given by (30).
In equilibrium, R&D expenditures, Dst (D
u
t ), depend in light of (32) positively (inversely) on the future
relative profitability, p˜ixt+1, of skilled-labor complementary innovations. Clearly, a prerequisite not only
for sustained economic growth, but also for a non-trivial interior solution of the model is St > 0 implied
by ZSt > 0, i.e.
ρ
1+γ+ρβ
[
1 + w˜tL˜t
]
> 1−β
ϕx,ut
1−τt
τt
. For the emergence of sustained economic growth
it is therefore insufficient that the labor income share exceeds the natural resource income share, i.e.
β > (1 − β), which would require that: β > 1/2. Since in reality β should be approximately 2/3, there
arises no threat from a too large resource income share. In this sense, a necessary condition for St > 0
and sustained economic growth is a sufficiently high expenditure share for old-age consumption ρ1+γ+ρ .
Aggregate savings fuel productivity growth and enhance the efficiency of natural resource use. Through
Hotelling’s rule, the evolution of the price per unit of natural resources is tight to the interest rate as
expressed by Eq. (9). On the other hand, the technology market clearing condition (29) links the interest
rate to the profitability of future innovations such that in equilibrium
gp,Rt+1 = 1 + rt+1 = pi
i
t+1η
i(N it )
−δ. (33)
22For details see Appendix B.4.
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Noting further that in equilibrium the markets for machines clear, i.e. N it (p
Y,i
t /p
x,i
t )
1
βLY,it = G
iN itϕ
x,i
t Rt,
the evolution of the depletion rate of natural resources evolves according to
τt+1 =
ZSt
ZNt
τt
1− τt
(
gϕ
x,u
t+1
)−1
, (34)
with ZNt = β(1− β)(1 + Ωt).
23
As we remarked earlier, a necessary condition for aggregate savings being positive is ZSt > 0. Otherwise,
savings, demand for machines and the depletion rate would jump to zero implying zero output in the
machine and the intermediate goods producing sectors. It is precisely the behavior of
ZSt
ZNt
that steers
natural resource depletion during the transition and in the long-run. During the transition, an increase in
ZSt relative to Z
N
t - which contains aggregate relative profits of future innovations (see (32)) - increases
the depletion rate of natural resources. In summary, the evolution of the economy is governed by a
four-dimensional system of difference equations containing the laws of motion for the population ratio,
L˜, the blueprint ratio, N˜ , the depletion rate, τ , and the fraction of unskilled households raising skilled
offspring, θ:
L˜t+1 =
θtn
u,s
t + n
s,sL˜t
(1− θt)nu,u
, (35)
N˜t+1 =
[
η˜σβ ((1− γ)/γ)
εβ
(A/B)(σ−1)(1−β)N˜−δσβt (˜L
Y
t+1)
(σ−1)β
] 1
β−(1−β)(σ−1)
, (36)
τt+1 =
ZSt
ZNt
τt
1− τt
(
gϕ
x,u
t+1
)−1
, (37)
and indifference condition (15)
w˜t+1 =
z + w˜tφ
z
, (38)
which determines θt+1 implicitly via, since w˜t+1 = w(N˜t+1, L˜
Y
t+1) = w(L˜
Y
t+1), see also (36), with L˜
Y
t+1 =
(1− φns,s)L˜t+1 − φθt+1n
u,s
t+1 (see (26)).
5. STEADY STATE
In this section we characterize the long-run equilibrium implied by the system of difference equations
(35)-(38) as functions of θ∗, where subscript ’∗’ denotes stationary values. Thereafter, we analyze the
effects of a change in the student-teacher ratio, φ, and in relative research productivities in R&D, η˜.
23For details see Appendix B.5.
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These parameters are of special interest, since they capture different policies aiming either at improving
schooling quality or a change in relative research infrastructure. It turns out that the parameter shocks
under consideration have diametrically different effects on the long-run growth rate of the economy.
Imposing steady state conditions on (35)-(38), the long-run equilibrium can be defined as follows
Definition 1
The long-run equilibrium consists of a set of stationary ratios {L˜∗, N˜∗} and shares {θ∗, τ∗} which imply
constant (gross) growth rates of the population and the productivity, {n∗, g∗}, a constant employment
ratio, L˜Y∗ , a constant skill wage premium, w˜∗, and constant relative prices p˜
Y
∗ .
At this point it is important to note that the long-run values of L˜∗, N˜∗ and θ∗ are independent from τ∗
while, in contrast, τ∗ can be expressed as a function of θ∗. The reason is that the difference equations
(35), (36) and (38) are decoupled from the evolution of τ , but τ is not decoupled from the evolution of
the other three variables.24 The following proposition presents the relevant long-run values as functions
of θ∗ (for details see Appendix A.2):
Proposition 2
The unique long-run equilibrium is characterized by L˜∗ = L˜(θ∗), N˜∗ = N˜(θ∗), τ∗ = τ(θ∗) with θ∗ implied
by (15), such that:
(i) The skilled-unskilled population ratio reads, in light of (35), as
L˜∗ = L˜(θ∗) =
θ∗n
u,s
∗
(1− θ∗)nu,u − ns,s
.25 (39)
The employment ratio in production specified in Proposition 2, L˜Y∗ , is thus a function of θ∗:
L˜Y∗ = L˜
Y (θ∗) = (1− φn
s,s)L˜∗ − φθ∗n
u,s
∗ =
θ∗n
u,s
∗ [1− φ(1− θ∗)n
u,u]
(1− θ∗)nu,u − ns,s
. (40)
(ii) The long-run blueprint ratio, N˜∗, reads
N˜∗ = N˜(θ∗) = η˜
σβ
ψ Γ
1
ψ
[
L˜Y (θ∗)
] (σ−1)β
ψ
, (41)
with Γ = ((1 − γ)/γ)εβ(A/B)(σ−1)(1−β) and ψ = β − (1 − β)(σ − 1) + δ(β + (σ − 1)β) > 0 in the
range of plausible parameters.
24This is not a peculiarity of our model but a common feature of endogenous growth models with exhaustible natural
resources.
25Note that nu,s
∗
= ν
(1+ν+ρ)(z+w˜∗φ)
, with w˜∗ =
z
z−φ
, see item (iii) of this preposition.
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(iii) The skilled wage premium is obtained as w˜(θ∗) = η˜
σ−1
ψ Γ
1+δ
ψ
[
L˜Y (θ∗)
]σ−1−β(1+δ)
ψ
, such that the share
of unskilled households raising skilled offspring, θ∗, is in light of (15) determined by
w˜(θ)∗ = η˜
σ−1
ψ Γ
1+δ
ψ
[
L˜Y (θ∗)
]σ−1−β(1+δ)
ψ
=
z
z − φ
. (42)
(iv) The long-run depletion rate of natural resources is implicitly specified by
τ∗ = 1−
ZS∗ (θ∗, τ∗)
ZN∗ (θ∗)
→ τ(θ∗), (43)
with ZS∗ < Z
N
∗ for τ∗ > 0 and Z
S
∗ > 0 for τ∗ < 1.
26
(v) Skilled and unskilled-labor complementary innovations evolve along the balanced growth path in
compliance with
g∗ = g
N,i
∗ =
[
(n∗)
β(gR∗ )
1−β
] 1
δ , i = u, s, (44)
where n∗ = n(θ∗) = (1− θ∗)n
u,u (see Eq. (39)) represents the average number of children in steady
state and gR∗ = 1− τ∗ the growth rate of extracted natural resources.
From Proposition 2, item (i), it follows that the skilled-unskilled population ratio, L˜∗, and thus the
employment ratio, L˜Y∗ , are increasing in the share of unskilled households raising skilled offspring, θ∗.
Hence, the long-run blueprint ratio, N˜∗ (see item (ii)), and subsequently the long-run skill premium,
w˜∗, are also rising in θ∗, given that σ > 1 + β(1 + δ). Imposing steady state conditions on indifference
condition (15), the long-run skill premium, w˜(θ∗), is fixed to the constant z/(z − φ), see (item (iii) and
Eq. (42)). Thus L˜Y∗ is obtained as
L˜Y∗ =
[
[z/(z − φ)]ψ
η˜σ−1Γ1+δ
] 1
σ−1−β(1+δ)
, (45)
with Γ = ((1 − γ)/γ)εβ(A/B)(σ−1)(1−β) and L˜Y∗ given by (40). Hence, an increase in θ∗ which induces
an increase in L˜Y∗ , can be caused by an increase in schooling quality φ or a reduction in relative research
productivities, η˜. Thus item (iii) of Proposition 2 implies
∂θ∗
∂φ
> 0, and
∂θ∗
∂η˜
< 0 (46)
for 0 < φ < z.27
An increase in φ increases the skilled wage premium, w˜∗, accompanied by an increase in L˜
Y
∗ which
26Note that ZS
∗
= ρ
1+γ+ρ
β[1 + ω˜∗L˜∗]−
1−β
ϕ
x,u
∗
1−τ∗
τ∗
and ZN
∗
= β(1− β)(1 + N˜1+δ
∗
η˜−1).
27Note that φ > z is meaningless and θ∗ = 0, if φ = 0, since then n
u,s
∗
= nu,u.
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ultimately directs technological change towards skilled labor complementary innovations reflected by
the increase in N˜∗ (see item (ii) of Proposition 2). In light of item (iii), the depletion rate of natural
resources is inversely related to the ratio between aggregate savings and aggregate relative profits of
future innovations, ZS∗ /Z
N
∗ . An increase in Z
S
∗ would raise aggregate expenditures on R&D, enhance
productivity growth, and thus reduce τ∗. Before we discuss this point more in detail, we turn to the long-
run growth rate of productivity, g∗, which is affected by n∗ as wells as τ∗, see item (iv) of Proposition
2. Obviously, the sign of δ, which represents the degree of intertemporal knowledge spillovers in R&D, is
crucial for the impact of population growth and natural resource depletion on productivity growth in the
long-run. If there are diminishing technological opportunities, i.e. δ > 0, an increase in n∗ would increase
productivity growth but an increase in τ∗ would reduce it, and vice versa for δ < 0. According to United
Nation’s long-run projections, a stationary world population seems to be the most plausible assumption
for the long-run, i.e. n∗ = 1. Under these circumstances, the prospects of long-run productivity growth
are rather pessimistic if R&D is subject to diminishing technological opportunities, i.e. δ > 1.28 Thus,
in view of stationary or even shrinking populations sufficiently large intertemporal knowledge spillovers
in R&D with respect to the existing stock of blueprints (δ < 0) are mandatory for sustained economic
growth.
So far we have gained insights into the behavior of the productivity growth rate, the population’s growth
rate and the depletion rate in the long-run. However, in order to assess the reaction of household income,
we need to know the growth rate of wage incomes which steers the level of overall savings, sit + p
R
t m
i
t,
and the level of consumption, cit, per households. In light of Proposition 2, we obtain for the evolution
of wages, gw
i
∗ , with i = u, s, in steady state (for details see Appendix A.4):
gw,i∗ =

 g∗(
gp,R∗
)1−β


1
β
= (n∗)
1−(1−β)(1+δ)
δ (1− τ∗)
(1−β)(1+δ)
δ . (47)
The economy moves along a sustainable growth path, whenever gw,i∗ ≥ 1, which implies at least non-
declining per-capita consumption levels in the long-run. For sustainable development to arise in its
weakest form, Eq. (47) suggests that productivity growth, g∗, must at least compensate for the increase
in the natural resource price, gp,R∗ , caused by an increasing shortage of natural resources.
Given that g∗ = [(n∗)
1/β(1− τ∗)
1−β ]1/δ, the reaction of g∗ in response to a change in φ or η˜ depends on:
28Under these circumstances the maximum productivity growth rate would be 0 for τ∗ = 0 and δ > 0. Hence for any
interior solution 0 < τ∗ < 1, the economy would exhibit negative productivity growth and a negative growth rate of the
wage rate in both sectors, see also (47) below.
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(a) δ ≷ 0, and (b) on the response of n∗ and τ∗. The following proposition summarizes the effects of a
change in φ on n∗, τ∗, and g∗:
Proposition 3
(i) The long-run growth rate of the population is inversely related to φ, i.e. ∂n∗∂φ < 0.
(ii) The long-run depletion rate of natural resources is inversely related to φ, i.e. ∂τ∗∂φ < 0, if 0 < φ <
φcrit < z and the degree of intertemporal knowledge spillover with respect to existing technological
knowledge is sufficiently large, in the sense that δ < δcrit. 29
(iii) The reaction of long-run productivity growth, g∗, in response to changes schooling quality, φ, i.e.
∂g∗
∂φ is determined by
∂g∗
∂φ
=
1
δ
[
nβ∗ (1− τ∗)
1−β
] 1−δ
δ
[
β
∂n∗
∂φ
(1− τ∗
n∗
)1−β
− (1− β)
( n∗
1− τ∗
)β ∂τ∗
∂φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gφ
]
. (48)
Thus ∂g∗∂φ > 0, if either 1/δ < 0 and G
φ < 0 or 1/δ > 0 and Gφ > 0. Moreover, Gφ ≷ 0, if
−β
∂θ∗
∂φ
1− θ∗
≷ (1− β)
∂τ∗
∂φ
1− τ∗
.30 (49)
Item (i) of Proposition 3 directly follows from (46): an increase in φ reduces ns,s and nu,s∗ but leaves n
u,u
unaffected. Since, on the other hand, θ∗ increases, the number of households raising unskilled offspring
shrinks. Thus population growth must decline as well because n∗ = (1− θ∗)n
u,u. The reasoning behind
item (ii) is as follows: an increase in φ stimulates aggregate savings because the population grows at
a slower pace but generates a higher level of wage incomes which implies that ZS∗ increases by more
than aggregate relative profits ZN∗ . This results from the combined effect of an increase in L˜∗ and w˜∗.
At the same time, relative aggregate profits increase, due to an increase in L˜Y∗ as well, but due to a
higher amount of skilled labor allocated to education, the increase in L˜Y∗ is smaller than the increase
in L˜∗. Consequently, aggregate relative profits, Z
N
∗ , increase by less than Z
S
∗ . Thus Z
S
∗ /Z
N
∗ increases
and ultimately reduces the long-run depletion rate of natural resources. Nevertheless, this mechanism
requires sufficiently large intertemporal spillovers with respect to existing technological knowledge, i.e.
δ < δcrit. If this condition is not met, the just described effect reverses in the sense that ZN∗ increases by
29A sketch of the proof can be found in Appendix A.3. Furthermore, note that φ ≥ z is meaningless because w˜∗ is infinity
for φ = z and negative for z < φ. In reality this restriction never becomes binding (see Section 6.1). Whether or not φcrit
is binding is not analytically clear. If it is binding, the sign of ∂τ∗
∂φ
turns positive for δ > δcrit. The other restriction is
φ < φcrit. If φ exceeds this threshold the amount of skilled labor available for production may actually shrink, due to the
high amount of teachers, see (40). Numerically, it turned out that φcrit plays only a role for very large φ close to z and δ
approximately around 0.25 which is very unrealistic scenario, see Section 6.1. Compare also Figure 2 and Appendix B.11.
30Since n∗ = (1− θ∗)nu,u, it follows that
∂n∗
∂φ
= − ∂θ∗
∂φ
.
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more than ZS∗ such that τ∗ rises in response to increases in φ. The intuition behind item (iii) is similar.
Note that within the range of plausible parameter values β/(1− θ∗) > (1− β)/(1− τ∗).
31 Given that we
just observed that the reaction of ZS∗ is stronger than the reaction of Z
N
∗ in response to changes in φ, we
should also expect that ∂θ∗∂φ > −
∂τ∗
∂φ and conjecture that G
φ < 0, such that ∂g∗∂φ > 0 if δ < 0.
In Figure 2, we illustrate the results discussed above with respect to changes in φ graphically for the
cases δ < 0 and δ > 0 under realistic assumptions regarding the set of parameters (see Section 6.1). An
increase in schooling quality clearly reduces population growth and the depletion of natural resources in
the long-run. In line with the above discussion in light of Proposition 3, the negative effect of φ on n∗ is
greater than the negative effect of φ on τ∗. Thus, productivity growth and the growth rate of wages shrink
if there are diminishing technological opportunities in R&D, i.e. δ > 0 because Gφ < 0. Whenever, φ
exceeds a critical level, the growth rate of productivity and wage income even turns negative. However, if
there are intertemporal knowledge spillovers with respect to existing technological knowledge, i.e. δ < 0,
schooling quality has to be sufficiently high in order to generate positive growth rates in productivity and
wage income.
Figure 2 about here
The effects of a change in the relative research productivity η˜ are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4
(i) The long-run growth rate of the population is positively related to η˜, i.e. ∂n∗∂η˜ > 0.
(ii) The long-run depletion rate of natural resources is positively related to η˜, i.e. ∂τ∗∂η˜ > 0, for η˜ ∈
(η˜#, η˜##), with η˜# ≥ η˜crit > 0 and η˜## ≤ +∞.32
(iii) The reaction of long-run productivity growth, g∗, in response to changes in relative research pro-
ductivities, η˜, i.e. ∂g∗∂η˜ is determined by
∂g∗
∂η˜
=
1
δ
[
nβ∗ (1− τ∗)
1−β
] 1−δ
δ
[
β
∂n∗
∂η˜
(1− τ∗
n∗
)1−β
− (1− β)
( n∗
1− τ∗
)β ∂τ∗
∂η˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gη˜
]
. (50)
Thus ∂g∗∂η˜ > 0, if either 1/δ < 0 and G
η˜ < 0 or 1/δ > 0 and Gη˜ > 0. Thus Gη˜ ≷ 0, if
−β
∂θ∗
∂η˜
1− θ∗
≷ (1− β)
∂τ∗
∂η˜
1− τ∗
(51)
31Given that β = 0.65 and θ∗ ∈ [0.1; 0.15], we find that β/(1− θ∗) > (1− β)/(1− τ∗) for 0 < τ∗ < 0.54, if θ∗ = 0.15. A
plausible value of τ∗ would be around 0.3. For details, see Section 6.1.
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Item (i) of Proposition 4 states that an increase in relative research productivity is associated with an
increase in population growth, n∗, because the skilled-unskilled employment ratio, L˜
Y
∗ , adjusts endoge-
nously through L˜∗ in order to meet indifference condition (42) again. The right-hand side of (42) remains
constant while the left-hand side experiences an increase through an increase in η˜, equality is again as-
sured through a decline in θ∗ (see also (46)). Thus L˜∗ and L˜
Y
∗ shrink and the long-run population’s
growth rate increases. This result is in sharp contrast to item (i) of Propositon 3.
Item (ii) implies that an increase in relative research productivities increases the depletion rate of natural
resources. The intuition behind this result is symmetric to item (ii) of Proposition 3 in the sense that the
induced reduction in L˜∗ reduces aggregate savings, i.e Z
S
∗ , by more than Z
N
∗ , such that τ∗ increases. In
light of this results (and contrary to Proposition 3), item (iii) of Proposition 4 suggests that we should
expect that Gη˜ > 0, given that realistically β/(1−θ∗) > (1−β)(1−τ∗) and that, as suggested by item (ii),
the induced change in θ∗ exceeds the induced change in τ∗, such that −
∂θ∗
∂η˜ >
∂τ∗
∂η˜ . If G
η˜ > 0 it follows
that ∂g∗∂η˜ > 0 if and only if δ > 0. The effects of an increase in η˜ are shown in Figure 3. It turns out
that an increase in relative research productivities has diametrically opposed effects on long-run growth
when compared to an increase in the teacher student ratio. An increase in the student teacher ratio
is conducive for economic growth if R&D is subject to positive intertemporal spillovers with respect to
existing technological knowledge (δ < 0), while an increase in relative research productivity enhances
long-run growth in the opposite case, i.e. if R&D is subject to diminishing technological opportunities
(δ > 0). The reason for the different effects is that the reaction of n∗ is of opposite sign in response to
changes in φ or η˜ while the induced change (in absolute terms) in population growth exceeds the change
in the depletion rate.
Figure 3 about here
Furthermore it is worth wile to note that gw∗ is like g
N
∗ a function of long-run population growth, n∗, and
the depletion rate, τ∗. Thus, the insights from Proposition 3 and 4 also apply for (47).
33
In the next section, we explore of the transitional dynamics of our model.
32A sketch of the proof can be found in Appendix A.4. Note that there exists a critical η˜ = η˜crit inducing a corresponding
level of θcrit
∗
such that (1 − θcrit
∗
)nu,u − ns,s = 0 and L˜∗ approaches +∞, see (39). Moreover, the second threshold level
η˜## seems to be irrelevant. We couldn’t exclude the existence analytically but never found a η˜## < +∞, numerically,
within the range of plausible parameter values. Note moreover that an increase in δ increases θ∗ and thus L˜Y∗ . At the same
time η˜crit increases. The proof follows simply from (45) and is available upon request.
33Note also that
1−(1−β)(1+δ)
δ
>
(1−β)(1+δ)
δ
, if 2β > 1/(1 + δ) which is for β around 2/3 and δ > 0 always full filled.
Only for very small δ, i.e. very large and unrealistically high intertemporal knowledge spillover, this restriction may be
violated.
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6. Computational Experiments
In the previous section we found that φ and η˜ affect the population’s growth rate and the depletion rate
of natural resources along the balanced growth path. In order to address the dynamic implications of
our theory, we calibrate the model and consider the dynamic implications of an increase in the teacher-
student ratio, φ, which may mirror quality improvements in the educational system.34 This numerical
experiment serves to reveal the interaction between endogenous variables during the transition to a long-
run equilibrium in response to a shock. In this sense our exercise has to be understood as a thought
experiment.35 In order to match our model to realistic parameter values and observed data points, we
have to adjust our model slightly. The reason for this is that the resource income share 1 − β is far to
high if β is set to 2/3, which implies a far to low investment share and under reasonable assumptions no
income growth while the depletion rate is accordingly above 0.9. In order to circumvent this problem, we
introduce labor, Lx,it , x = u, s into the production functions of machines.
36 Thus, production functions
for machines modify to
xit(l) = G
iN it (Lt(l)
x,i)1−α(Rt(l)
x,i)α, Gi > 0. (52)
Hence, the labor income share reads now ξL = β+(1−α)(1−β) and the resource income share ξR equals
α(1− β), such that ξL + ξR = 1.37
6.1 Calibration
Since one period encompasses approximately thirty years, we chose for the discount factor of future
consumption, ρ, a value that is standard in real-business-cycle literature: 0.99 per quarter, i.e. ρ = 0.99120
in our context. The parameter β represents the labor share in intermediate goods production and is set
to 0.65. In the U.S., energy expenditures as a share of GDP amounted to 8.8% in 2006 with a maximum
close to 14% at the beginning of the eighties (see Energy Information Administration, 2009). Hence, 8.8%
constitutes an upper limit for the resource income share of non-renewables in our model. We therefore
set α = 0.08, which implies ξR = α(1− β) = 0.028 in each intermediate sector. The parameter φ reflects
34We omit the discussion of a shock in η˜, since the effects do qualitatively not differ to a shock in φ. The only difference
is that w˜∗ is invariant with respect to changes in η˜.
35This experiment is important, since it is compatible with an increase in both the skill wage premium and the relative
supply of skills in the long-run.
36We assume sector specific labor in order to keep the model tractable and in line with the analytical results because this
assumption assures that the skill ratios in intermediate and machine production are identical, i.e. L˜xt = L˜
Y
t .
37The modified system contains the previous system as a special case for α = 1, such that the theoretical results remain
valid. The system is presented in Appendix B.8.
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the teacher-student ratio and is set to 1/20. Moreover, child-rearing is subject to forgone consumption
possibilities and losses in potential lifetime earnings which amount to 13% for highly educated women
and higher if women drop out of the labor market completely (Dankmeyer, 1996). The direct time cost
for parents raising a child to adulthood amounts to 50% of parents’ time endowment (see de la Croix
and Doepke, 2003), which would imply z = 0.075 as a lower limit. Taking losses in lifetime earnings into
account, we set z = 0.15, which matches the U.S. skilled wage premium w˜∗ = 1.5 (Acemoglu, 2002). The
weight of children, ν, in the utility function drives the growth rate of the population. We choose a value of
ν = 0.26, which generates approximately zero population growth in the long-run (−0.0007 ≈ 0 per year).
Now there are five parameters left: the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods in final good
production, ε, the weight of Y ut in final good production, γ, the ratio of the productivity parameters in
R&D, η˜, the ratio of productivity parameters in machine production, AB , and the externality parameter
in R&D, δ. We fixed these parameters by matching our model to a long-run productivity growth rate of
2.4%, an investment share, ItYt , in the vicinity of 14.43% - fitting the 10 year average of US private fixed
capital formation as a share of GDP38 (OECD Economic Outlook Database), and an employment share
in education of around 2%. In addition, the long-run decline in the natural resource stock is matched
to 2.4% per year which causes via Hotelling’s rule a long-run interest rate close to 4%. Moreover, we
fit the skilled population ratio, L˜∗, to approximately 0.6 which is in line with the relative supply of
college skills in the US (Acemoglu, 1998). The remaining parameters are therefore fixed as follows:
ε = 2.4, γ = 0.655, η˜ = 2.2, δ = −0.045, and AB = 8.
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6.2 Equilibrium Dynamics
In our numerical exercise (see Figure 4), we increase the teacher-student ratio φ by 1% which may reflect
an increase in the quality of schools. We start with the discussion of the long-run effects. Indifference
condition (15) implies that the long-run wage differential adjusts to w˜∗ =
z
z−φ . After an increase in φ, it
is more beneficial for the unskilled population group to raise skilled offspring. Consequently, θ∗ increases.
Figure 4 about here
With a higher fraction of unskilled households raising skilled offspring, the long-run skilled-unskilled
38For the derivation of the investment share, see Appendix B.7.
39The numeric method is described in Appendix B.9. Given the parameter constellation the dynamic system exhibits two
positive eigenvalues within the unit circle and two outside the unit circle, such that the economy is subject to saddle-point
stability. This constellation is robust for a very large range of parameters with the exception of ε < 2. Note also that the
transitory behavior is independent from δ ≷ 0.
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population ratio, L˜∗ =
(
Ls
Lu
)
∗
, must increase as well. Consequently, relative demand for skilled-labor
complementary machines,
(
Xs
Xu
)
∗
, increases which generates an increase in the ratio of R&D expenditures,(
Ds
Du
)
∗
, and the blueprint ratio, N˜∗ =
(
Ns
Nu
)
∗
. Therefore, the share of extracted natural resources allocated
to the s-sector, ϕx,s∗ , must increase as well. With a higher fraction of unskilled households wishing to
educate their offspring to become skilled workers, the long-run growth rate of the population, n∗, must
decline. In light of Proposition 3, item (ii), a higher share of unskilled households raising skilled offspring
in response to an increase in φ is associated with a lower depletion rate of natural resources. At the
same time the investment share of GDP, ( IY )∗, increases in the long-run (Z
S
∗ increases), where long-run
productivity growth amounts to 2.62% in comparison to 2.4% in the baseline scenario given that we
assumed δ < 0, here.
We now turn to the transitory effects of an increase in φ. Since the current wage differential is below
its long-run value as well as the skilled-unskilled population ratio, a smooth convergence of the latter
to its new long-run value requires that the share of unskilled households raising skilled offspring, θt,
adjusts from above to the new long-run value. Hence, the growth rate of the skilled population group
must be above its long-run value too. The opposite is true for the unskilled population group. As
nu,u > ns,s > nu,st , the population’s growth rate converges from below to its actual long-run value. The
increase in θt raises demand for skilled labor in the education sector such that
LE,st
Lt
increases at the expense
of employment ratios of skilled labor in production, L˜Yt . Consequently, the wage differential between
skilled and unskilled labor increases given the state of technology, N˜t. Since the (relative) market size
for skilled-labor complementary innovations is currently reduced, the share of natural resources allocated
to the u-sector must increase, i.e. ϕx,st declines. At the same time, the depletion rate increases in order
to satisfy aggregate demand for machines. During the transition, θt converges from above to its higher
long-run value, such that relative demand for skilled labor declines in the education sector as well. As
this process comes along with an increasing skilled-unskilled population ratio, the employment ratios of
skilled labor in production must rise. Therefore, skill-biased technological change meets an increase in
the skilled population group. The (transitory) decline in θt and the increase in relative wages that is
responsible for a decline in nu,st cause a decline in the growth rate of the skilled population group and
an increase in the growth rate of the unskilled population group. With a lower demand for labor in the
education sector and increasing employment ratios of skilled labor in production the depletion rate of
natural resources declines during the transition while the growth rate of the population increases.
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7. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
At the core of our theory is the negative relationship between population growth and human capital
investments. As we have seen in the previous sections, a change in φ and a change in η˜ have opposite
effects on long-run growth. An increase in φ enhances long-run growth prospects if there are intertem-
poral knowledge spillovers in R&D (δ < 0), but reduces growth in the case of diminishing technological
opportunities (δ > 0). An increase in relative research productivity, η˜, is in turn conducive for long-run
growth if δ > 0 but it is harmful for productivity growth if δ < 0.
An increasing number of skilled households reduces long-run population growth and reduces the deple-
tion rate of natural resources. In this way, an increase in schooling quality increases the wage premium
for skilled labor and increases the share of unskilled households that wish to raise skilled offspring. If
R&D is subject to diminishing technological opportunities, i.e. δ > 0, our framework suggests a negative
association between an increase in φ and long-run productivity growth. The described channel gains in
importance if one accepts long-run projections of world population growth and the argument that, in
the long-run, positive population growth on a finite planet is infeasible. Given that n∗ = 1, the long-run
growth prospects are rather pessimistic, if δ > 0. In this scenario our theory suggests that an increase in
relative research productivities, η˜ is preferable. But as we will see below, it might still be reasonable to
subsidize education. In order to keep the discussion brief, we assume as a limiting case of a progressive
tax scheme that only skilled-labor is taxed while the tax rate on unskilled labor is zero. Tax revenues
are used to subsidize education for unskilled households. Denote by 0 ≤ T s ≤ 1, the constant tax rate
on skilled labor and by sEt the subsidy share allocated to unskilled households that wish to raise skilled
offspring. Fertility decisions of agents i = s, u modify as follows40
ns,s =
ν
(1 + ν + ρ)(z(1− T s) + φ)
, (53)
nu,st =
ν
(1 + ν + ρ)(z + w˜tφ(1− sEt ))
, (54)
nu,u =
ν
(1 + ν + ρ)z
. (55)
In light of fertility decisions (53)-(55), nu,ut remains constant because unskilled labor income is not taxed
while the number of skilled children born in unskilled as well as in skilled households increases. The
latter effect is caused by the reduction in opportunity cost of child rearing time, (1 − T s)zwst (see Eq.
40The budget constraints read as: (1−TS)wst = ((1−T
s)z+φ)wstn
s,s
t +c
s
t +p
R
t m
s
t +s
s
t ;w
u
t = (zw
u
t +φ(1−s
E
t )w
s
t )n
u,s
t +
cut + p
R
t m
u
t + s
u
t ;w
u
t = zw
u
t n
u,u
t + c
u
t + p
R
t m
u
t + s
u
t . A balanced budget in the education sector requires w
s
tφ(n
s,s
t L
s
t + (1−
sEt )n
u,s
t θtL
u
t ) + SUBt = w
s
tL
E,s
t , with SUBt = T
swstL
s
t = s
E
t n
u,s
t θtL
u
t w
s
tφ.
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(53)), and the former by the education subsidy (see (54)).41 Assuming moreover that parents internalize
the taxation of future skilled labor income in their utility function, skilled offspring is weighted by the
expected post-tax income in the subsequent period, i.e. (1 − T s)wst+1n
i,s
t , i = s, u. Thus, indifference
condition (15) modifies in the long-run to42
w˜∗ =
z
(1− T s)z − φ(1− sE∗ )
. (56)
with sE∗ =
T sL˜∗
φθ∗n
u,s
∗
= T
s
φ
1+ν+ρ
[
(1−θ∗)ν
z
− ν
(1−Ts)z+φ
] .
At this point it is worthwhile to note that we can expect that an increase in taxes on skilled labor will
reduce the long-run skill wage premium compatible with indifference condition (56), because φ << z.
This reduces the share of unskilled households raising skilled offspring in the long-run such that θ∗ shrinks.
At the same time the number of skilled offspring raised in skilled and unskilled households increases. Both
effects in combination induce an increase in the long-run growth rate of the population, n∗. Given that
δ > 0, i.e. R&D is subject to diminishing technological opportunities, an increasing subsidy share sE∗
would increase the growth rate of productivity and wage incomes.43
8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we integrate the features of (skill-biased) directed technological change, fertility decline
and natural resource use into a comprehensive framework. More specifically, we consider an overlapping
generations economy populated by skilled and unskilled households who decide on the number of children
they wish to raise and their educational attainment. Thus, the composition of the population in terms
of skilled and unskilled households is endogenous, while the skilled wage premium generates differential
fertility between skilled and unskilled households, such that fertility is inversely related to wages and edu-
cation. Consequently, the skilled-unskilled population ratio and the skill bias of technological innovations
are jointly determined in equilibrium. Regarding the production side of our model, we consider a scale
invariant growth model of directed technological change, in line with Acemoglu (1998;2002), where the
41Note that taxation of unskilled households would also reduce their opportunity cost of child rearing time. If skilled
households would also receive a subsidy, their level of fertility would also increase due to a reduction of education cost while
sE shrinks given T s and φ.
42During the transition, the indifference condition reads as (1 − T s)w˜t+1 =
z+w˜tφ(1−s
E
t )
z
which equals (15) for T s = 0
implying sEt = 0.
43Given the set of parameters discussed in Section 6.1, an economy with φ = 1/20 and δ = 0.045 would be unable to
generate positive productivity growth (g∗ ≈ −0.03), in the long-run. A numerical experiment revealed that such an economy
needed a subsidy share, sE
∗
, above 0.4 in order to generate positive long-run growth.
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production of machines is subject to a non-renewable natural resource as an essential input. We are thus
able to analyze the interaction between population dynamics, the skill bias of innovations, and natural
resource depletion. We believe that our results have strong implications for economic policies aimed at
sustainable development in view of nonrenewable natural resources and zero population growth in the
long-run, especially as the long-run productivity growth rate is not policy invariant in our framework.
In regards to the relationship between the depletion rate of natural resources and population growth,
we find a negative association during the transition, but a positive association in the long-run. Long-
run productivity growth is determined by the population’s growth rate, the depletion rate of natural
resources, and the sign of intertemporal spillovers in R&D with respect to existing technological knowl-
edge. If R&D is subject to negative spillovers, i.e. diminishing technological opportunities, a decline in
the population’s growth rate will have an adverse impact on productivity growth while the associated
decline in the depletion rate will have a positive impact on productivity growth, and vice versa for pos-
itive intertemporal spillovers. We show that in general, the impact of a change in population growth
on productivity growth will be larger than the impact of a change in the depletion rate on productivity
growth. In our analysis we focus on changes in relative research productivities and the teacher-student
ratio because we consider these parameters as particularly policy relevant. While the former captures the
efficiency of the research infrastructure, a change in the teacher-student ratio can be seen as a metaphor
for schooling quality. We find that an increase in relative research productivities has diametrically op-
posed effects on long-run growth in comparison to an increase in the teacher student ratio. The latter is
conducive for economic growth if R&D is subject to positive intertemporal spillovers, while an increase in
relative research productivities enhances long-run growth if R&D is subject to diminishing technological
opportunities. The reason for this is that an increase in the teacher-student ratio reduces population
growth while an increase in relative research productivity increases population growth. Moreover, our
results suggests that a progressive taxation of skilled-labor income used to finance an education subsidy
for unskilled households increases population growth. Hence, this policy is beneficial for long-run growth
if R&D is subject to diminishing technological opportunities.
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A. MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1, item(iii)
Given profit maximizing behavior and perfect competition on factor markets, the value marginal products
of natural resources in machine production are equalized between the s- and the u-sector and are both
equal to pRt . Note further that the ratio of marginal production costs reads
(c˜xt )
−1 =
A
B
N˜t. (A.1)
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Taking account for profit maximizing demand for machines (21) and relative prices of intermediates (24),
we obtain
Rx,st = ((1− γ)/γ)
ε
σ (N˜t)
σ−1
σ (L˜Yt )
σ−1
σ (c˜xt )
(σ−1)(β−1)
σβ Rx,ut . (A.2)
As Rt = R
xu
t +R
x,s
t , we obtain (27) and (28).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Along the balanced growth path, the blueprint ratio, employment ratios of labor and the wage differential
of skilled labor are constant, we therefore know from (30) that
N˜∗ = (η˜)
σ
1+δσ ((1− γ)/γ)
ε
1+δσ (L˜Y∗ )
σ−1
1+δσ (c˜x∗)
(σ−1)(β−1)
β(1+δσ) . (A.3)
Substituting for c˜x∗ yields (41) which implies together with (25), w˜∗ as specified in (42).
Uniqueness θ∗:
Since L˜∗ =
θ∗n
u,s
∗
(1−θ∗)nu,u−ns,s
, L˜Y∗ = (1− φn
s,s)L˜∗ − φθ∗n
u,s
∗ and ω∗ =
z
z−φ , we obtain
(1− φns,s)L˜∗ − φθ∗n
u,s
∗ = Φ¯,
with Φ¯ =
[(
z
z−φ
)ψ (
ηs
ηu
)1−σ (
1−γ
γ
)εβ(1+δ) (
A
B
)(1−σ)(1−β)(1+δ)] 1σ−1−β(1+δ)
, and ψ = β − (1− β)(σ − 1) +
δ(β + (σ − 1)β), such that
θ2∗ + θ∗
Φ2
Φ1
−
Φ3
Φ1
= 0, (A.4)
with Φ1 = φn
u,unu,s∗ ; Φ2 = (1 − φn
s,s)nu,s∗ + Φ¯n
u,s − (nu,u − ns,s)φnu,s∗ ; Φ3 = Φ¯(n
u,u − ns,s). With one
positive and one negative root, the solution to (A.4) is unique. Hence, L˜∗, L˜
Y
∗ and N˜∗ are unique and
constant as well which implies that pY,s∗ and p
Y,u
∗ are constant and unique as well.
Uniqueness τ∗:
The long-run rate of depletion is implicitly defined by
F (θ∗, τ∗) = 1−
ZS∗ (θ∗, τ∗)
ZN∗ (θ∗)
− τ∗ = 0, (A.5)
with
ZS∗ (θ∗, τ∗) =
ZS,A
∗︷ ︸︸ ︷
ρ
1 + ν + ρ
β
(
1 +
z
z − φ
L˜∗
)
−
ZS,B
∗︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− β)(1 + Ψ∗)
1− τ∗
τ∗
, (A.6)
= ZS,A∗ − Z
S,B
∗
1− τ∗
τ∗
, (A.7)
Ψ∗ = ((1− γ)/γ)
ε
σ (A/B)
(σ−1)(1−β)
σβ (N˜∗)
σ−1
σβ (L˜Y∗ )
σ−1
σ (A.8)
31
and
ZN∗ = β(1− β)
(
1 + η˜−1N˜1+δ∗
)
. (A.9)
Eq. (B.106) exhibits two real solutions τ1,2∗ (one negative and one positive), such that the only economi-
cally meaningful solution is
τ∗ =
1
2
[
1−
Z1︷ ︸︸ ︷(
ZS,A∗
ZN∗
+
ZS,B∗
ZN∗
)]
+
{1
4
[
1−
Z1︷ ︸︸ ︷(ZS,A∗
ZN∗
+
ZS,B∗
ZN∗
)]2
+
Z2︷ ︸︸ ︷
ZS,B∗
ZN∗
}1/2
(A.10)
τ∗ =
1− Z1
2
+
{ (1− Z1)2
4
+ Z2
}1/2
(A.11)
Note that the disriminant is always positive since ZB∗ , Z
N
∗ > 0→ Z2 > 0.
Moreover, as τ∗ and θ∗ are unique, there exists a unique balanced growth path.
Item (iv):
Given a symmetric equilibrium, the production function of intermediate Y i, i = u, s writes as
Y it = N
i
t (R
x,i
t )
(1−β)(LY,i)β , (A.12)
such that the steady state gross-growth rate of Y it , g
Y,i
∗ , i = u, s is given by
gY,i∗ = g
N,i
∗ (g
R
∗ )
1−β(gL∗ )
β . (A.13)
Since innovations evolve according to (20) and are fueled by aggregate savings, we obtain in steady state
gD,i∗ = g
Y,i
∗ . Moreover, in steady state, we yield from (20)
1 =
gD,i∗
(gN,i∗ )1+δ
=
gY,i∗
(gN,i∗ )1+δ
. (A.14)
Hence, (gN,i∗ )
1+δ = gY,i∗ = g
N,i
∗ (g
L
∗ )
β(gR∗ )
1−β and
gN,i∗ =
[
nβ∗ (1− τ∗)
(1−β)
] 1
δ
, (A.15)
since gRt+1 = (1− τt)
τt+1
τt
and τ∗ = τt = τt+1.
Since the wages in units of final output read wit = (1 − β)
1−2β
β (pY,it )
1
β (N it )
1
β (cx,it )
β−1
β , the corresponding
growth rates can be expressed by44
gw∗ = g
ws
∗ = g
wu
∗ =
[
gN∗
(gR∗ )
1−β
] 1
β
=
[
nβ∗ (1− τ∗)
1−β
] 1
δ
[
1− τ∗
n∗
]1−β
. (A.16)
44In Appendix B.6, we exploit the general equilibrium structure more in detail.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3, item (ii)
In light of (A.11), ∂τ∗∂φ < 0,if
45
∂τ∗
∂φ
= −
∂Z1
∂φ
+
[ (1− Z1)2
4
+ Z2
]−1/2[−∂Z1∂φ (1− Z1)
2
+
∂Z2
∂φ
]
< 0 (A.17)
which requires that
∂Z1
∂φ
∂Z2
∂φ
Z2 > −(1− Z1) +
∂Z2
∂φ
∂Z1
∂φ
(A.18)
Note that:
(i) ZN∗ , Z
S,A
∗ , Z
S,B
∗ > 0 with Z
N
∗ < Z
S,B
∗ and Z
N
∗ > Z
S,A
∗ in the range of plausible parameter values,
such that 1− (ZS,A∗ /Z
N
∗ + Z
S,B
∗ /Z
N
∗ ) < 0.
(ii) Thus (1− Z1) < 0.
(iii) It follows from (i) and (ii) that Z2 > −(1− Z1), since
ZS,B
∗
ZN
∗
> −[1−
ZS,A
∗
+ZS,B
∗
ZN
∗
]⇒ ZN∗ > Z
S,A
∗ .
(iv) ∂Z2∂φ =
∂
Z
S,B
∗
ZN
∗
∂φ < 0
(v) ∂Z1∂φ >
∂Z2
∂φ , since[
∂ZS,A
∗
∂φ +
∂ZS,B
∗
∂φ
]
ZN∗ − [Z
S,A
∗ + Z
S,B
∗ ]
∂ZN
∗
∂φ
(ZN∗ )
2
>
∂ZS,B
∗
∂φ Z
N
∗ − Z
S,B
∗
∂ZN
∗
∂φ
(ZN∗ )
2
(A.19)
∂ZS,A
∗
∂φ Z
N
∗ − Z
S,A
∗
∂ZN
∗
∂φ
(ZN∗ )
2
> 0, (A.20)
which is in light of the Implicit function theorem a sufficient condition for ∂τ∗∂φ < 0.
(vi) Since ∂Z2∂φ < 0,
∂Z1
∂φ < 0 is in light of (iii) and (iv) a necessary condition for
∂τ∗
∂φ < 0.
Next steps: sign
{∂ ZS,A∗
ZN
∗
∂φ
}
and sign
{∂ ZS,B∗
ZN
∗
∂φ
}
.
Proposition 5
The ratio ZS,B∗ /Z
N
∗ is monotonically declining in the interval φ ∈ (0, z), i.e.
∂ZS,B
∗
/ZN
∗
∂φ < 0.
The proof makes use of the curvatures of ZS,B∗ and Z
N
∗ in φ and demonstrates Z
S,B
∗ exhibits a lower
curvature than ZN∗ . Since booth function are increasing and convex in φ, it follow that Z
S,B
∗ /Z
N
∗ is a
declining function in φ.
45A detailed version of this proof can be found in Appendix B.11.
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Proposition 6
The ratio ZS,A∗ /Z
N
∗ is increasing in φ, i.e.
∂ZS,A
∗
/ZN
∗
∂φ > 0, if the degree of intertemporal knowledge
spillovers in R&D with respect to existing technological knowledge is sufficiently high, i.e. δ < δcrit.
Proof:
Since N˜1+δ∗ = η˜
σβ(1+δ)
ψ Γ
1+δ
ψ (L˜Y∗ )
(σ−1)β(1+δ)
ψ , with ψ = β − (1 − β)(σ − 1) + δ(β + (σ − 1)β), we obtain
further
ZS,A∗
ZN∗
=
ρ
1+ν+ρ
(
1 + Lˆ∗
)
(1− β)
(
1 + Γ˜[L˜Y∗ ]
ψ˜
) . (A.21)
Thus,
∂ZS,A
∗
/ZN
∗
∂φ > 0, if
∂Lˆ∗
∂φ
+ Γ˜(L˜Y∗ )
ψ˜
[
∂Lˆ∗
∂φ
− ψ˜
(1 + Lˆ∗)
L˜Y∗
∂LY∗
∂φ
]
> 0, (A.22)
with ψ˜ = (σ−1)β(1+δ)ψ and Lˆ∗ =
z
z−φ L˜∗. Note moreover that
• ∂Lˆ∗∂φ∂δ ;
∂L˜Y
∗
∂φ ;
∂L˜Y
∗
∂φ∂δ > 0
•
∂
(1+Lˆ∗)
L˜Y
∗
∂δ ≥ 0, if
∂Lˆ∗
∂δ /
∂L˜Y
∗
∂δ > (1 + Lˆ)/L˜
Y
∗ for φ > φ˜ < z.
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Thus it follows that There exists a critical δcrit for a φ = φcrit < z given , such that δ ≥ δcrit implies[
∂Lˆ∗
∂φ
− ψ˜
(1 + Lˆ∗)
˜˜LY∗
∂L˜Y∗
∂φ
]
φ=φcrit
≤ 0, (A.23)
which is a necessary condition for
∂ZS,A
∗
/ZN
∗
∂φ < 0.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4, item (ii)
Note that:47
(i) An increase in η˜ induces a decline in θ∗, i.e.
∂θ∗
∂η˜ < 0, and thus a decline in L˜∗ as well as L˜
Y
∗ , i.e.
∂L˜∗
∂η˜ < 0 and
∂L˜Y ∗
∂η˜ < 0.
(ii) Since L˜∗ =
θ∗n
u,s
∗
(1−θ∗)nu,u−ns,s
, it follows that there exists a critical η˜ = η˜crit, such that (1− θ∗)n
u,u −
ns,s = 0. Hence, L˜∗ exhibits a vertical asymptote at η˜ = η˜
crit, with L˜∗ > 0 for η˜ > η˜
crit and L˜∗ < 0
for η˜ < η˜crit. Moreover, limη˜→η˜crit = +∞, if η˜ > η˜
crit and limη˜→η˜crit = −∞, if η˜ < η˜
crit.
46If φ > φ˜ we know that L˜Y
∗
increases in δ. If this is the case, L˜∗ must increase as well. Since this increases the demand
for teachers, the increase in L˜∗ must be stronger than the increase in L˜Y∗ .
47A detailed version of the proof can be found in Appendix B.12.
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Consequently, economic meaningful solutions are obtained, if η˜ > η˜crit. Since furthermore
(a)
∂ZS,B
∗
/ZN
∗
∂η˜ = 0
(b) thus ∂τ∗∂η˜ ≷ 0 depends in light of the Implicit function theorem on the sign of
∂ZS,A
∗
/ZN
∗
∂η˜ ≶ 0 because
∂τ∗
∂η˜ = −
Fη˜
Fτ∗
, with Fτ∗ < 0 and Fη˜ = −
∂ZS,A
∗
∂η˜ .
(c)
∂ZS,A
∗
/ZN
∗
∂η˜ < 0 for η ∈ (η˜
#, η˜##), with η˜## ≤ +∞ and η˜# ≥ η˜crit and thus
∂τ∗
∂η˜
> 0. (A.24)
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B. Further Derivations - Not for Publication
B.1 Derivation of the price index
For readers’ convenience we omit the time index. Aggregate output Y is composed out of two interme-
diates Y u and Y s and is subject to the following CES-production function:
Y =
[
γ(Y u)
ε−1
ε + (1− γ)(Y s)
ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
. (B.1)
Competitive behavior implies the following optimality conditions for profit maximizing factor demand,
given that pY ≡ 1
∂Y
∂Y u
=
[
γ(Y u)
ε−1
ε + (1− γ)(Y s)
ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1−1
γ(Y u)
ε−1
ε
−1 − pY,u = 0, (B.2)
∂Y
∂Y s
=
[
γ(Y u)
ε−1
ε + (1− γ)(Y s)
ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1−1
(1− γ)(Y s)
ε−1
ε
−1 − pY,s = 0. (B.3)
Hence, relative factor prices for intermediates read
pY,s
pY,u
=
1− γ
γ
(
Y s
Y u
)− 1
ε
, (B.4)
implying that
Y s =
(
1− γ
γ
)ε(
pY,u
pY,s
)ε
Y u. (B.5)
Moreover, production costs write as
C = pY,uY u + pY sY s, (B.6)
C = pY,uY u + pY s
(
1− γ
γ
)ε(
pY,u
pY,s
)ε
Y u, (B.7)
C = Y u
[
pY,u + pY,s
(
1− γ
γ
)ε(
pY,u
pY,s
)ε]
. (B.8)
In light of the last expression we are able to express factor demand for intermediates in final good
production in terms of production costs, C, factor prices and parameters of the production function
Y u =
C
pY,u + pY,s
(
1−γ
γ
)ε (
pY,u
pY,s
)ε , (B.9)
Y u =
C
(pY,u)εγ−ε[(pY,u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY,s)1−ε]
, (B.10)
Y u =
C(pY,u)−εγε
(pY,u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY,s)1−ε
. (B.11)
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Manipulating terms, yields
(Y u)
ε−1
ε =
C
ε−1
ε (pY,u)1−εγε−1
[(pY,u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY,s)1−ε]
ε−1
ε
, (B.12)
γ(Y u)
ε−1
ε =
C
ε−1
ε (pY,u)1−εγε
[(pY,u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY s)1−ε]
ε−1
ε
, (B.13)
and similarly
(1− γ)(Y s)
ε−1
ε =
C
ε−1
ε (pY,s)1−ε(1− γ)ε
[(pY,u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY,s)1−ε]
ε−1
ε
. (B.14)
Taking this two results together yields
γ(Y u)
ε−1
ε + (1− γ)(Y s)
ε−1
ε = (B.15)
=
C
ε−1
ε (pY,u)1−εγε
[(pY,u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY,s)1−ε]
ε−1
ε
+
C
ε−1
ε (pY,s)1−ε(1− γ)ε
[(pY,u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY,s)1−ε]
ε−1
ε
, (B.16)
=
C
ε−1
ε
[(pY,u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY,s)1−ε]
ε−1
ε
[
γε(pY,u)1−ε + (1− γ)ε(pY,s)1−ε
]
, (B.17)
=
C
ε−1
ε
[(pY,u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY,s)1−ε]−
1
ε
. (B.18)
Since, Y =
[
γ(Y u)
ε−1
ε + (1− γ)(Y s)
ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
=
[
C
ε−1
ε
[(pY,u)1−εγε+(1−γ)ε(pY,s)1−ε]−
1
ε
] ε
ε−1
,
it follows immediately that
Y = C[(pY,u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY,s)1−ε]
1
ε−1 , (B.19)
and finally
Y [(pY,u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY,s)1−ε]
1
1−ε = C, (B.20)
with p ≡ 1 = [(pY,u)1−εγε + (1− γ)ε(pY,s)1−ε]
1
1−ε representing the price index of Y .
B.2 Allocation of Extracted Natural Resources
Prefect competition and profit maximizing behavior imply
pRt = p
x,u
t
Xst
Rx,st
= px,st
Xut
Rx,ut
. (B.21)
Since px,it =
cx,it
1−β , we obtain
c˜xt X˜t = c˜
x
t N˜tx˜t = (c˜
x
t )
1−β
β (p˜Yt )
1
β N˜tL˜
Y,s
t =
Rx,st
Rx,ut
. (B.22)
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Observing that p˜Yt =
pY,st
pY,ut
yields
Rx,st
Rx,ut
= ((1− γ)/γ)
ε
σ (N˜t)
σ−1
σ (L˜Y,st )
σ−1
σ (c˜xt )
(σ−1)(1−β)
σβ . (B.23)
As an efficient use of extracted natural resources requires Rx,st +R
x,u
t = Rt,
we finally arrive to
Rx,ut =
1
1 + ((1− γ)/γ)
ε
σ (N˜t)
σ−1
σ (L˜Y,st )
σ−1
σ (c˜xt )
(σ−1)(1−β)
σβ
= ϕx,ut Rt, (B.24)
Rx,st =
((1− γ)/γ)
ε
σ (N˜t)
σ−1
σ (L˜Y,st )
σ−1
σ (c˜xt )
(σ−1)(1−β)
σβ
1 + ((1− γ)/γ)
ε
σ (N˜t)
σ−1
σ (L˜Y,st )
σ−1
σ (c˜xt )
(σ−1)(1−β)
σβ
= ϕx,st Rt. (B.25)
B.3 Dynamics of the Blueprint Ratio
In light of (29) and (22), we know that
N˜t+1 = η˜
σ[(1− γ)/γ]ε(L˜Yt+1)
σ−1(N˜t)
−δσ(c˜xt+1)
(σ−1)(1−β)
β , (B.26)
such that substitution for ωt+1 in the marginal cost ratio yields
N˜t+1 = η˜
σ[(1− γ)/γ]ε(L˜Yt+1)
σ−1(N˜t)
−δσ
(
A/BN˜t+1
) (σ−1)(1−β)
β
, (B.27)
N˜t+1 =
[
η˜σβ [(1− γ)/γ]εβ(A/B)(σ−1)(1−β)(N˜t)
−δσβ(L˜Yt+1)
(σ−1)β
] 1
β−(1−β)(σ−1)
. (B.28)
B.4 Aggregate Savings
Aggregate savings are given by the sum of savings in both population groups
St = (s
u
t − p
R
t m
u
t )L
u
t + (s
s
t − p
R
t m
s
t )L
s
t . (B.29)
Hence,
St =
ρ
1 + γ + ρ
(wut L
u
t + w
s
tL
s
t )− p
R
t Mt, (B.30)
=
ρ
1 + γ + ρ
wut L
u
t
[
1 + w˜tL˜t
]
− pRt Mt, (B.31)
where Mt represents the aggregate natural resource stock in period t. Since
wut = p
Y,u
t β
Y ut
LY,ut
, (B.32)
pRt = p
Y,u
t (1− β)
Y ut
Rx,ut
, (B.33)
and
LY,ut = L
u
t , (B.34)
Rt = τtMt−1, (B.35)
Rx,ut = ϕ
x,u
t Rt, (B.36)
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we obtain
St =
ρ
1 + γ + ρ
βpY,ut Y
u
t
[
1 + w˜tL˜t
]
− pY,ut (1− β)
Y ut
Rx,ut
Mt, (B.37)
=
ρ
1 + γ + ρ
βpY,ut Y
u
t
[
1 + w˜tL˜t
]
−
pY,ut (1− β)Y
u
t Mt
ϕx,ut τtMt−1
. (B.38)
Since MtMt−1 = 1− τt, it follow outright that
St = p
Y,u
t Y
u
t
{
ρ
1 + γ + ρ
β
[
1 + w˜tL˜t
]
−
1− β
ϕx,ut
1− τt
τt
}
. (B.39)
B.5 Depletion Rate of Natural Resources
The derivation proceeds in the following steps
(1) The evolution of the resource price gp
R
t+1
(2) The evolution of the technology stock gN
u
t+1
(3) The evolution of price-cost ratio
gp
Y,u
t+1
gc
u
t+1
using the technology market clearing condition a) and the
market clearing condition for machines b)
(4) (3) a) and b) determine the evolution of τ
In equilibrium, the evolution of the depletion rate of natural resource takes account for: (i) the evolution of
the price per unit of natural resources is tight to the interest factor by Hotelling’s rule (1 + rt+1 = g
pR
t+1)
while (ii) the free-entry ondition in R&D (1 + rt+1 = pi
u
t+1η
u(Nut )
−δ) links the interest rate to the
profitability of future innovations. To begin with we start with the free-entry condition in R&D
1 + rt+1 = pi
u
t+1η
u (Nut )
−δ
(B.40)
which implies togehter with Hotelling’s rule
piut+1η
u (Nut )
−δ
= gp
R
t+1. (B.41)
(1) Evolution of gp
R
t+1:
Since Mt =Mt+1 +Rt+1, it follows Rt+1 =Mt
[
1− Mt+1Mt
]
and
Rt+1
Rt
=
Mt
Mt−1
[
1− Mt+1Mt
1− MtMt−1
]
. (B.42)
As additionally Rt+1 = τt+1Mt, we yield
Mt+1 = Mt −Rt+1 = (1− τt+1)Mt, (B.43)
Mt+1
Mt
= (1− τt+1). (B.44)
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Therefore,
gRt+1 =
Rt+1
Rt
= (1− τt)
[
1− (1− τt+1)
1− (1− τt)
]
= (1− τt)
τt+1
τt
. (B.45)
As the inverse demand function for machines in the u-sector reads as
px
u
t = p
Y u
t (x
u
t )
−β(Lut )
β =
cut
1− β
=
pRt
(1− β)BNut
, (B.46)
⇒ pRt = (1− β)BN
u
t p
Y u
t (x
u
t )
−β(Lut )
β (B.47)
and noting further that xut = X
u
t /N
u
t = Bϕ
xu
t Rt, we obtain
pRt = (1− β)BN
u
t p
Y u
t (Bϕ
xu
t Rt)
−β(Lut )
β , (B.48)
such that the evolution of the resource price is given by
gp
R
t+1 = g
Nu
t+1g
pY u
t+1 (g
ϕx,u
t+1 g
R
t+1)
−β(gL
u
t+1)
β = 1 + rt+1 = pi
u
t+1η
u (Nut )
−δ
. (B.49)
(2) Evolution of gN
u
t+1:
Since pY,ut Y
u
t = w
u
t L
Y,u
t + p
x,u
t X
u
t , it follows
pY,ut Y
u
t = βp
Y,u
t
Y ut
LY,ut
LY,ut + p
x,u
t X
u
t , (B.50)
and pY,ut Y
u
t =
px,ut X
u
t
1−β .
Profits of a machine producing firm in sector u read as
piut = p
x,u
t x
u
t − c
u
t x
u
t . (B.51)
Hence, piut + c
u
t x
u
t = p
x,u
t x
u
t , where substitution for pi
u
t and x
u
t yields
px,ut x
u
t = β(1− β)
1−β
β (put )
1
β (cut )
β−1
β LY,ut + c
u
t
(
(1− β)pY,ut
cut
) 1
β
LY,ut , (B.52)
= (1− β)
1
β (put )
1
β (cut )
β−1
β LY,ut
[
β
1− β
+ 1
]
, (B.53)
= (1− β)
1−β
β (put )
1
β (cut )
β−1
β LY,ut =
piut
β
. (B.54)
Therefore, we are allowed to specify
put Y
u
t =
putX
u
t
1− β
=
Nut pi
u
t
β(1− β)
. (B.55)
Combining the last expression with aggregate savings (31), we yield
St =
Nut pi
u
t
β(1− β)
ZSt . (B.56)
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As Dut =
1
1+Ωt
St we yield together with (20)
Nut+1 =
ηu (Nut )
1−δ
piut
β(1− β)
ZSt
1 + Ωt
. (B.57)
Defining ZNt = β(1− β)(1 + Ωt) yields
Nut+1 = η
u (Nut )
1−δ
piut
ZSt
ZNt
, (B.58)
gN
u
t+1 = η
u (Nut )
−δ
piut
ZSt
ZNt
. (B.59)
(3) Evolution of
gp
Y,u
t+1
gc
u
t+1
:
(a)
Plugging the last expression into (B.49) yields
ηu (Nut )
−δ
piut
ZSt
ZNt
gp
Y,u
t+1 (g
ϕx,u
t+1 g
R
t+1)
−β(gL
u
t+1)
β = piut+1η
u (Nut )
−δ
(B.60)
such that
gpi
u
t+1 =
ZSt
ZNt
gp
Y,u
t+1 (g
ϕx,u
t+1 g
R
t+1)
−β(gL
u
t+1)
β = (gp
Y,u
t+1 )
1
β (gc
u
t+1)
β−1
β gL
u
t+1, (B.61)
while the last part of the equation stems from the definition of operating profits of machine pro-
ducers. Hence (
gp
Y,u
t+1
gc
u
t+1
) 1−β
β
=
ZSt
ZNt
(gϕ
x,u
t+1 g
R
t+1)
−β(gL
u
t+1)
β−1. (B.62)
(b)
Market clearing requires
Nut
(
pY,ut
px,ut
) 1
β
= BNut ϕ
x,u
t Rt. (B.63)
Therefore, (
gp
Y,u
t+1
gc
u
t+1
) 1
β
= gϕ
x,u
t+1 g
R
t+1(g
Lu
t+1)
−1. (B.64)
(4) Evolution of τ :
Combining the last expression with (B.62) yields
gϕ
x,u
t+1 g
R
t+1 =
ZSt
ZNt
1
1−β
(gϕ
x,u
t+1 g
R
t+1)
− 11−β (B.65)
⇒ gRt+1 =
τt+1(1− τt)
τt
=
ZSt
ZNt
(gϕ
x,u
t+1 )
−1 (B.66)
τt+1 =
τt
1− τt
ZSt
ZNt
(gϕ
x,u
t+1 )
−1. (B.67)
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B.6 Productivity Growth
This proof exploits the general equilibrium structure more in detail in order to verify the growth rate of
innovations gN
i
∗ .
From the previous proof we know that
gN,ut+1 = η
u (Nut )
−δ
piut
ZSt
ZNt
. (B.68)
Substituting for piut gives
gN,ut+1 = η
u (Nut )
−δ
β(1− β)
1−β
β (pY,ut )
1
βLY,ut (c
u
t )
β−1
β
ZSt
ZNt
. (B.69)
Since along the bgp: gN,ut+1 = g
Nu
t = g
Nu
∗ , the previous equation implies
gN,ut+1
gN,ut
= 1 = (gN,u∗ )
−δn∗(g
c,u
∗ )
β−1
β . (B.70)
Marginal production cost evolve according to
gc,u∗ =
gp,R∗
gN,u∗
(B.71)
As pRt = p
Y,u
t (1 − β)
Y ut
Rx,ut
, we yield: gp,Rt+1 = g
pY,u
t+1 g
N,u
t+1
(
gL,ut+1
)β (
gϕ
x,u
t+1 g
R
t+1
)−β
. Since pY,ut and ϕ
x,u
t are
constant in steady state, we obtain
gp,R∗ = g
N,u
∗ n
β
∗ (1− τ∗)
−β . (B.72)
Combining the last expression with gc,u∗ gives
gc,u∗ = n
β
∗ (1− τ∗)
−β . (B.73)
Combining the last equation with 1 =
(
gN,u∗
)−δ
(gc,u∗ )
β−1
β n∗, yields
gN,u∗ = g
N,s
∗ =
[
nβ∗ (1− τ∗)
1−β
] 1
δ . (B.74)
B.7 Investment Share of GDP
Since we consider a closed economy: It = St. Investment as a share of GDP,
It
Yt
, writes as
It
Yt
=
put Y
u
t Z
S
t
Yt
. (B.75)
Since pYt ≡ 1 =
[
γε(pY,ut )
1−ε + (1− γ)ε(pY,st )
1−ε
] 1
1−ε
, we obtain
1 = pY,ut
[
γε + (1− γ)ε
( pY,st
pY,ut
)1−ε] 11−ε
, (B.76)
pY,ut =
[
γε + (1− γ)ε(p˜Yt )
1−ε
] 1
ε−1
.48 (B.77)
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For
Y ut
Yt
, we yield
Y ut
Yt
=
Y ut[
γ
(
Y ut
) ε−1
ε
+ (1− γ)
(
Y st
) ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
, (B.78)
Y ut
Yt
=
1[
γ + (1− γ)
(
Y st
Y ut
) ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
, (B.79)
with
Y st
Y ut
=
Nst
Nut
p
1−β
β
t
cut
cst
1−β
β LY,st
LY,ut
.
Hence,
It
Yt
=
put Y
u
t Z
S
t
Yt
, (B.80)
It
Yt
=
[
γε + (1− γ)ε(p˜Yt )
1−ε
] 1
ε−1
[
γ + (1− γ)
(
Y st
Y ut
) ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
ZSt , (B.81)
with
(
I
Y
)
∗
= const..
B.8 The model with labor and natural resources in machine production
(1) Marginal production cost of machines
cx,it (w
i
t, p
R
t ) =
(
wit
)1−α (
pRt
)α
AN it (1− α)
1−ααα
, (B.82)
with i = s, u (for details see Appendix B.2).
(2) Labor market
LY,st =
β
ξL
(Lst − L
E,s
t ), L
x,s
t =
ξLx
ξL
(Lst − L
E,s
t ), (B.83)
LY,ut =
β
ξL
Lut , L
x,u
t =
ξL,x
ξL
Lut , (B.84)
with ξLx = (1−α)(1− β), ξL = β + (1−α)(1− β), LY,st +L
x,s
t +L
E,s
t = L
s
t , L
Y,u
t +L
x,u
t = L
u
t (for
details see Appendix B.3). Moreover,
LY,st
LY,ut
=
Lx,st
Lx,ut
= (1− φns,s)
Lst
Lut
− φθtn
u,s
t .
48Note that this verifies also that pY,u
∗
is constant as p˜Y
∗
is constant. As pY,s
∗
= p˜Y
∗
pY,u
∗
, it follows outright that
pY,s
∗
= const..
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(3) The dynamic system
L˜t+1 =
θtn
u,s
t + n
s,sL˜t
(1− θt)nu,u
, (B.85)
N˜t+1 =
[(
ηs
ηu
)
N˜−δt
] (β+(σ−1)ξL)
β−ξR(σ−1)
(B.86)
[(
1− γ
γ
)εβ (
L˜Yt+1
)(σ−1)ξL (A
B
)(σ−1)(1−β)] 1β−ξR(σ−1)
, (B.87)
τt+1 =
ZSt
ZNt
τt
1− τt
(
gϕ
Rxu
t+1
)−1
, (B.88)
with L˜Yt+1 = (1− φn
s,s)L˜t+1 − φθt+1n
u,s
t+1 and indifference condition (15)
ωt+1 =
z + ωtφ
z
.
which determines θt+1 implicitly via (25).
(4) The steady state
L˜∗ =
θ∗n
u,s
∗
(1− θ∗)nu,u − ns,s
. (B.89)
w˜∗ =
z
z − φ
, (B.90)
where w˜∗ =
[
(η˜)
σ−1
(
1−γ
γ
)εβ(1+δ) (
L˜Y∗
)σ−1−β(1+δ)
∗
(
A
B
)(σ−1)(1−β)(1+δ)] 1ψ
.
N˜∗ =
[
(η˜)
β+(σ−1)ξL
(
1− γ
γ
)εβ (
L˜Y∗
)(σ−1)ξL
∗
(
A
B
)(σ−1)(1−β)] 1ψ
, (B.91)
τ∗ = 1−
ZS∗
ZN∗
, (B.92)
where ψ = β − ξR(σ − 1) + δ(β + (σ − 1)ξL) > 0 in the range of plausible parameters. Skilled and
unskilled-labor complementary innovations evolve along the balanced growth path in compliance
with
g∗ = g
Ni
∗ =
[
nξ
L
∗ (1− τ∗)
ξR
] 1
δ
, i = u, s. (B.93)
B.9 Numeric Method
As described above, the dynamic behavior is fully determined by a four-dimensional system of difference
equations - as given by (B.85)-(B.88) and (15) - involving two state variables: L˜ and N˜ , as well as two
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jump variables: θ and τ . The Jacobian of the dynamic system evaluated at the steady state, J∗, is equal
to
J∗ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂L˜t+1
∂θt
|∗
∂L˜t+1
∂L˜t
|∗
∂L˜t+1
∂N˜t
|∗
∂L˜t+1
∂τt
|∗
∂θt+1
∂θt
|∗
∂θt+1
∂L˜t
|∗
∂θt+1
∂N˜t
|∗
∂θt+1
∂τt
|∗
∂n˜t+1
∂θt
|∗
∂N˜t+1
∂L˜t
|∗
∂N˜t+1
∂N˜t
|∗
∂N˜t+1
∂τt
|∗
∂τt+1
∂θt
|∗
∂τt+1
∂L˜t
|∗
∂τt+1
∂N˜t
|∗
∂τt+1
∂τt
|∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
. (B.94)
The dynamic system exhibits numerically two unstable eigenvalues (λ1, λ4 > 1) and two stable eigenvalues
(λ2, λ3 < 1), such that the dynamics of the economy is subject to saddle-point stability along a two-
dimensional manifold.49 The solution of the linearized system reads as∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
L˜t
θt
N˜t
τt
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A1 λ
t
1
A2 λ
t
2
A3 λ
t
3
A4 λ
t
4
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
L˜∗
θ∗
N˜∗
τ∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
, (B.95)
where P contains the eigenvectors p1, p2, p3, p4 and A1, A2, A3, A4 represent arbitrary constants. With
λ1, λ4 > 1, it follows immediately that A1 = A4 = 0, such that
L˜t = p2,1A2λ
t
2 + p3,1A3λ
t
3 + L˜∗ (B.96)
θt = p2,2A2λ
t
2 + p3,2A3λ
t
3 + θ∗ (B.97)
N˜t = p2,3A2λ
t
2 + p3,3A3λ
t
3 + N˜∗ (B.98)
τt = p2,4A2λ
t
2 + p3,4A3λ
t
3 + τ∗. (B.99)
With
Lst=0
Lut=0
= L˜0 > 0 and
Nst=0
Nut=0
= N˜0 > 0 given, the unknown constants A2, A3 are determined by the
solution of
L˜0 = p2,1A2 + p3,1A3 + L˜∗, (B.100)
N˜0 = p2,3A2 + p3,3A3 + N˜∗, (B.101)
such that the initial values 0 < τ0 < 1 and 0 ≤ θ0 ≤ 1 are known.
B.10 Growth rate of wages
Since Y ut = (1− β)
1−2β
β Nut (p
Y,u
t /c
u
t )
1−β
β LY,ut and w
u
t = p
Y,u
t
∂Y ut
∂LY,ut
, it follows that
wut = (1− β)
1−2β
β Nut (p
Y,u
t )
1
β (cut )
β−1
β , (B.102)
49In the second row of J∗ we applied the Implicit function theorem numerically to (15). Moreover we plotted the
characteristic polynomial with respect to changes in one parameter. It turned out that the constellation of eigenvalues is
robust. For ε < 2, the system becomes unstable.
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with cut =
pRt
BNut
, such that
wut = (1− β)
1−2β
β (Nut )
1
β (pY,ut )
1
β (pRt )
β−1
β . (B.103)
Thus wut evolves along the bgp as follows
gw,u∗ =
[
gN,u∗
(gp,R∗ )1−β
] 1
β
. (B.104)
Substituting for gp,R∗ and g
N,u
∗ yields finally
gw,u∗ = g
w,s
∗ = (n∗)
1−(1−β)(1+δ)
δ (1− τ∗)
(1−β)(1+δ)
δ . (B.105)
B.11 Proof of Proposition 3, item (ii), Detailed Version
The long-run rate of depletion is implicitly defined by
F (θ∗, τ∗) = 1−
ZS∗ (θ∗, τ∗)
ZN∗ (θ∗)
− τ∗ = 0, (B.106)
with
ZS∗ (θ∗, τ∗) =
ZS,A
∗︷ ︸︸ ︷
ρ
1 + ν + ρ
β
(
1 +
z
z − φ
L˜∗
)
−
ZS,B
∗︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− β)(1 + Ψ∗)
1− τ∗
τ∗
, (B.107)
= ZS,A∗ − Z
S,B
∗
1− τ∗
τ∗
, (B.108)
Ψ∗ = ((1− γ)/γ)
ε
σ (A/B)
(σ−1)(1−β)
σβ (N˜∗)
σ−1
σβ (L˜Y∗ )
σ−1
σ (B.109)
and
ZN∗ = β(1− β)
(
1 + η˜−1N˜1+δ∗
)
. (B.110)
Eq. (B.106) exhibits two real solutions τ1,2∗ (one negative and one positive), such that the only economi-
cally meaningful solution is
τ∗ =
1
2
[
1−
Z1︷ ︸︸ ︷(
ZS,A∗
ZN∗
+
ZS,B∗
ZN∗
)]
+
{1
4
[
1−
Z1︷ ︸︸ ︷(ZS,A∗
ZN∗
+
ZS,B∗
ZN∗
)]2
+
Z2︷ ︸︸ ︷
ZS,B∗
ZN∗
}1/2
(B.111)
τ∗ =
1− Z1
2
+
{ (1− Z1)2
4
+ Z2
}1/2
(B.112)
Thus ∂τ∗∂φ reads as follows
∂τ∗
∂φ
= −
∂Z1
∂φ
2
+
1
2
[ (1− Z1)2
4
+ xZ2
]−1/2[−∂Z1∂φ (1− Z1)
2
+
∂Z2
∂φ
]
. (B.113)
Apparently, ∂τ∗∂φ < 0, if
∂τ∗
∂φ
= −
∂Z1
∂φ
+
[ (1− Z1)2
4
+ Z2
]−1/2[−∂Z1∂φ (1− Z1)
2
+
∂Z2
∂φ
]
< 0 (B.114)
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which requires that
∂Z1
∂φ
∂Z2
∂φ
Z2 > −(1− Z1) +
∂Z2
∂φ
∂Z1
∂φ
(B.115)
Note that:
(i) ZN∗ , Z
S,A
∗ , Z
S,B
∗ > 0 with Z
N
∗ < Z
S,B
∗ and Z
N
∗ > Z
S,A
∗ in the range of plausible parameter values,
such that 1− (ZS,A∗ /Z
N
∗ + Z
S,B
∗ /Z
N
∗ ) < 0.
(ii) Thus (1− Z1) < 0.
(iii) It follows from (i) and (ii) that Z2 > −(1− Z1), since
ZS,B∗
ZN∗
> −[1−
ZS,A∗ + Z
S,B
∗
ZN∗
] (B.116)
⇒ ZN∗ > Z
S,A
∗ (B.117)
(iv) ∂Z2∂φ =
∂
Z
S,B
∗
ZN
∗
∂φ < 0
(v) ∂Z1∂φ >
∂Z2
∂φ , since[
∂ZS,A
∗
∂φ +
∂ZS,B
∗
∂φ
]
ZN∗ − [Z
S,A
∗ + Z
S,B
∗ ]
∂ZN
∗
∂φ
(ZN∗ )
2
>
∂ZS,B
∗
∂φ Z
N
∗ − Z
S,B
∗
∂ZN
∗
∂φ
(ZN∗ )
2
(B.118)
∂ZS,A
∗
∂φ Z
N
∗ − Z
S,A
∗
∂ZN
∗
∂φ
(ZN∗ )
2
> 0, (B.119)
which is a sufficient condition for ∂τ∗∂φ < 0.
Proof:
As τ∗ is implicitly defined by
F = 1−
ZS,A∗
ZN∗
+
ZS,B∗
ZN∗
1− τ∗
τ∗
⇒
dτ∗
dφ
= −
Fφ
Fτ∗
. (B.120)
Since Fτ∗ = −
ZS,B
∗
ZN
∗
τ2
∗
−1 < 0 it follows that dτ∗dφ ≶ 0 if Fφ ≶ 0. As Fφ = −
∂ZS,A
∗
/ZN
∗
∂φ +
∂ZS,B
∗
/ZN
∗
∂φ
1−τ∗
τ∗
,
with
∂ZS,B
∗
/ZN
∗
∂φ < 0 it follows that
∂ZS,A∗ /Z
N
∗
∂φ
> 0 (B.121)
is sufficient for Fφ < 0 and thus sufficient for
dτ∗
dφ < 0. Further below we demonstrate that this
condition depends on δ < δcrit.
(vi) Since ∂Z2∂φ < 0,
∂Z1
∂φ < 0 is in light of (iii) and (iv) a necessary condition for
∂τ∗
∂φ < 0.
Next steps
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• sign
{∂ ZS,A∗
ZN
∗
∂φ
}
• sign
{∂ ZS,B∗
ZN
∗
∂φ
}
Proposition 7
The ratio ZS,B∗ /Z
N
∗ is monotonically declining in the interval φ ∈ (0, z), i.e.
∂ZS,B
∗
/ZN
∗
∂φ < 0.
Proof:
Using (B.107)-(B.110) implies
ZS,2∗
ZN∗
=
1 + Ψ∗
β(1 + η−1N˜1+δ∗ )
, (B.122)
with Ψ∗ and N˜
1+δ
∗ being increasing functions in L˜
Y
∗ , if σ > 1 and δ > −1.
Note that:
• L˜Y∗ is increasing in φ.
• For φ = 0, the schooling sector is shut down and skilled labor is not supplied (nu,s = ns,s = nu,u),
such that θ∗ = 0 and L˜∗ = L˜
Y
∗ = 0, such that
ZS,B
∗
ZN
∗
= 1β > 1 for 0 < β < 1.
• For φ → z, the skilled wage premium, w∗ = z/(z − φ), approaches infinity. Thus θ∗ = 1 and the
supply of unskilled labor is zero, such that limφ→z L˜∗ = limφ→z L˜
Y
∗ = +∞.
• The curvature of ZN∗ and Z
S,B
∗ with respect to changes in φ can be expressed by the corresponding
Arrow-Pratt measures as follows:
APS,B = −
(ZS,B∗ )
′′
(ZS,B∗ )′
φ = −
[∂2ZS,B∗ /∂L
∗
Y
2][∂2L∗Y /∂φ
2]
[∂ZS,B∗ /∂L∗Y ][∂L
∗
Y /∂φ]
φ (B.123)
APS,N = −
(ZS,N∗ )
′′
(ZS,N∗ )′
φ = −
[∂2ZS,N∗ /∂L
∗
Y
2][∂2L∗Y /∂φ
2]
[∂ZS,N∗ /∂L∗Y ][∂L
∗
Y /∂φ]
φ (B.124)
It follows that
ZS,B
∗
ZN
∗
is declining (increasing) in φ, if APS,B ≶ APN implying that
∂2ZS,B∗ /∂L
∗
Y
2
∂ZS,B∗ /∂L∗Y
≶
∂2ZS,N∗ /∂L
∗
Y
2
∂ZS,B∗ /∂L∗Y
(B.125)
→
δσβ + βσ2 − 3σβ + σ − 1 + β
σ(βσ − σ + 1 + δσβ)
≶
(σ − 1)− δβ − β
βσ − σ + 1 + δσβ
(B.126)
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and therefore APS,B < APS,N because
δσβ + βσ2 − 3σβ + σ − 1 + β < σ(σ − 1)− δσβ − σβ, (B.127)
β(σ − 1)2 + σ − 1 < σ(σ − 1), (B.128)
β < 1, (B.129)
with 0 < β < 1.
Proposition 8
The ratio ZS,A∗ /Z
N
∗ is increasing in φ, i.e.
∂ZS,A
∗
/ZN
∗
∂φ > 0, if the degree of intertemporal knowledge
spillovers in R&D with respect to existing technological knowledge is sufficiently high, i.e. δ < δcrit.
Proof:
In light of (B.107) and (B.110) we obtain
ZS,A∗
ZN∗
=
ρ
1+ν+ρ
(
1 +
Lˆ∗︷ ︸︸ ︷
z
z − φ
L˜∗
)
(1− β)
(
1 + η˜−1N˜1+δ∗
) . (B.130)
Since N˜1+δ∗ = η˜
σβ(1+δ)
ψ Γ
1+δ
ψ (L˜Y∗ )
(σ−1)β(1+δ)
ψ , with ψ = β − (1 − β)(σ − 1) + δ(β + (σ − 1)β), we obtain
further
ZS,A∗
ZN∗
=
ρ
1+ν+ρ
(
1 + Lˆ∗
)
(1− β)

1 + η˜ σβ(1+δ)−ψψ Γ 1+δψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ˜
(L˜Y∗ )
(σ−1)β(1+δ)
ψ


(B.131)
=
ρ
1+ν+ρ
(
1 + Lˆ∗
)
(1− β)
(
1 + Γ˜[L˜Y∗ ]
ψ˜
) . (B.132)
Thus,
∂ZS,A
∗
/ZN
∗
∂φ > 0, if
∂Lˆ∗
∂φ
+ Γ˜(L˜Y∗ )
ψ˜
[
∂Lˆ∗
∂φ
− ψ˜
(1 + Lˆ∗)
L˜Y∗
∂LY∗
∂φ
]
> 0, (B.133)
with ψ˜ = (σ−1)β(1+δ)ψ .
Denote the function L˜Y∗ as a function of φ for a given δ by L˜
Y
∗ (φ; δ). We now show that
(i) L˜∗Y (φ = 0; δ) is declining in δ
(ii) given that δ1 > δ0, L˜
∗
Y (φ; δ1) intercepts the function L˜
∗
Y (φ; δ0) at φ = φ˜ from below
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(iii) since limφ→z L˜
∗
Y (φ; δ1) = limφ→z L˜
∗
Y (φ; δ0) =∞, it follows that
∂L˜Y∗
∂φ∂δ
> 0 (B.134)
and
∂L˜Y∗
∂δ
≷ 0, if φ ≷ φ˜ (B.135)
ad (i) First note that
L˜Y∗ (φ = 0, δ) =
[
η˜σ−1((1− γ)/γ)−εβ(1+δ)(A/B)−(σ−1)(1−β)(1+δ)
] 1
σ−1+β(1+δ)
(B.136)
and thus
∂L˜Y∗ (φ = 0, δ)
∂δ
=
L˜Y∗ (φ = 0, δ)
[1− σ + δ(1 + β)]2
{
βε[(1 + δ)β − (σ − 1)] ln((1− γ)/γ (B.137)
+(σ − 1)[β(δ + σ − β(1 + δ)− (σ − 1))] ln(A/B) (B.138)
+ ln L˜Y∗ (φ = 0, δ)
}
(B.139)
Since
– empirically L˜Y∗ < 1. Thus L˜
Y
∗ (φ = 0; δ) << 1 which implies that ln L˜
Y
∗ (φ = 0, δ) < 0
– βε[(1 + δ)β − (σ − 1)] < 0, if 1 + δ < σ−1β
– (σ − 1)[β(δ + σ − β(1 + δ)− (σ − 1))] < 0, if
β(δ + σ − β(1 + δ)) < (σ − 1) (B.140)
β(σ − β + δ(1− β)) < (σ − 1) (B.141)
β(σ + 1− 1− β + δ(1− β)) < (σ − 1) (B.142)
β(σ − 1 + (1− β)(1 + δ)) < (σ − 1) (B.143)
β(σ − 1) + β(1− β)(1 + δ) < (σ − 1) (B.144)
→ 1 + δ <
σ − 1
β
(B.145)
Thus it follow that L˜Y∗ (φ = 0, δ) is declining in δ, i.e.
∂L˜Y∗ (φ = 0, δ)
∂δ
< 0. (B.146)
ad (ii) Therefore, L˜Y∗ (φ = 0; δ1) < L˜
∗
Y (φ = 0; δ0) given that δ1 > δ0, and
L˜Y∗ (φ; δ1) = L˜
Y
∗ (φ; δ0) (B.147)
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at
φ = φ˜ = z

1−
(
η˜σ−1((1− γ)/γ)εβ(1+δ0)(A/B)(σ−1)(1−β)(1+δ0)
) σ−1−β(1+δ1)
β(σ−1)2(δ1−δ0)
(
η˜σ−1((1− γ)/γ)εβ(1+δ1)(A/B)(σ−1)(1−β)(1+δ1)
) σ−1−β(1+δ0)
β(σ−1)2(δ1−δ0)

 (B.148)
As the second term in squared brackets is smaller than one, it follows that 0 < φ˜ < z. Thus,
L˜Y∗ (φ; δ1) cuts L˜
Y
∗ (φ; δ0) from below. Together with limφ→z L˜
Y
∗ (φ; δ1) = limφ→z L˜
Y
∗ (φ; δ0) =∞ we
can thus conclude that
∂L˜Y∗ (φ, δ)
∂δ
≷ 0, if φ ≷ φ˜ (B.149)
ad (iii) and
∂L˜Y∗ (φ, δ)
∂φ∂δ
> 0. (B.150)
The results are visualized in the figure above. As can be verified, a necessary condition for
∂ZS,A
∗
/ZN
∗
∂φ < 0
is
∂ZS,A
∗
/ZN
∗
∂φ∂δ < 0, which requires
∂[∂Lˆ∗∂φ − ψ˜
(1+Lˆ∗)
L˜Y
∗
∂L˜Y
∗
∂φ ]
∂δ
=
∂Lˆ∗
∂φ∂δ
−
∂ψ˜
∂δ
(1 + Lˆ∗)
L˜Y∗
∂L˜Y∗
∂φ
− ψ˜
∂ (1+Lˆ∗)
L˜Y
∗
∂δ
∂L˜Y∗
∂φ
(B.151)
−ψ˜
(1 + Lˆ∗)
L˜Y∗
∂L˜Y∗
∂φ∂δ
< 0
Note that
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• ∂Lˆ∗∂φ∂δ ;
∂L˜Y
∗
∂φ ;
∂L˜Y
∗
∂φ∂δ > 0
•
∂
(1+Lˆ∗)
L˜Y
∗
∂δ ≥ 0, if
∂Lˆ∗
∂δ /
∂L˜Y
∗
∂δ > (1 + Lˆ)/L˜
Y
∗ for φ > φ˜.
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The figure below demonstrate the behavior of Z1 =
ZS,A
∗
+ZS,B
∗
ZN
∗
, Z2 =
ZS,B
∗
ZN
∗
and
ZS,A
∗
ZN
∗
as functions of φ
Thus it follows
(i) There exists a critical δcrit for a φ = φcrit < z given , such that δ ≥ δcrit implies[
∂Lˆ∗
∂φ
− ψ˜
(1 + Lˆ∗)
L˜Y∗
∂L˜Y∗
∂φ
]
φ=φcrit
≤ 0
.
(ii) Given the set of parameters assumed in this paper revealed that
∂ZS,A
∗
/ZN
∗
∂φ < 0 is a rather unlikely
case.
(iii) Nevertheless it is worthwhile to note that
∂ZS,A
∗
/ZN
∗
∂φ < 0 is a sufficient condition for
∂τ∗
∂φ > 0.
50If φ > φ˜ we know that L˜Y
∗
increases in δ. If this is the case, L˜∗ must increase as well. Since this increases the demand
for teachers, the increase in L˜∗ must be stronger than the increase in L˜Y∗ .
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The following figures illustrate for the case of δ = 0.25 that for very large φ the sign of ∂τ∗∂φ turns positive
because
∂ZS,A
∗
/ZN
∗
∂φ∂δ < 0.
Figure: Example for
∂ZS,A
∗
/ZN
∗
∂φ∂δ < 0 with δ = 0.25 and very large φ
B.12 Proof of Proposition 4, item (ii), Detailed Version
Note that:
(i) An increase in η˜ induces a decline in θ∗, i.e.
∂θ∗
∂η˜ < 0, and thus a decline in L˜∗ as well as L˜
Y
∗ , i.e.
∂L˜∗
∂η˜ < 0 and
∂L˜Y ∗
∂η˜ < 0.
(ii) Since L˜∗ =
θ∗n
u,s
∗
(1−θ∗)nu,u−ns,s
, it follows that there exists a critical η˜ = η˜crit, such that (1− θ∗)n
u,u −
ns,s = 0. Hence, L˜∗ exhibits a vertical asymptote at η˜ = η˜
crit, with L˜∗ > 0 for η˜ > η˜
crit and L˜∗ < 0
for η˜ < η˜crit. Moreover, limη˜→η˜crit = +∞, if η˜ > η˜
crit and limη˜→η˜crit = −∞, if η˜ < η˜
crit.
Consequently, economic meaningful solutions are obtained, if η˜ > η˜crit. Since furthermore
(a)
∂ZS,B
∗
/ZN
∗
∂η˜ = 0
(b) thus ∂τ∗∂η˜ ≷ 0 depends in light of the Implicit function theorem on the sign of
∂ZS,A
∗
/ZN
∗
∂η˜ ≶ 0 because
∂τ∗
∂η˜ = −
Fη˜
Fτ∗
, with Fτ∗ < 0 and Fη˜ = −
∂ZS,A
∗
∂η˜ .
(c) Within the range of reasonable parameter values
∂ZS,A
∗
/ZN
∗
∂η˜ < 0 and thus
∂τ∗
∂η˜
> 0 (B.152)
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ad (a) Proof:
∂ZS,B
∗
/ZN
∗
∂η˜ = 0
∂ZS,B∗ /Z
N
∗
∂η˜
=
∂ZS,B
∗
∂η˜ Z
N
∗ −
∂ZN
∗
∂η˜ Z
S,B
∗
(ZN∗ )
2
= 0, (B.153)
→
∂ZS,B
∗
∂η˜
∂ZN
∗
∂η˜
=
ZS,B∗
ZN∗
, (B.154)
Note now that
∂ZS,B∗
∂η˜
=
1
ψη˜
{
(1− β)(1− γ)/γ)
ε
σ (A/B)
(σ−1)(1−β)
σβ
[
η˜σβ(1− γ)/γ)εβ(LY∗ )
(σ−1)β
] (σ−1)
ψσβ
(σ − 1)(LY∗ )
σ−1
σ
}
(B.155)
and
∂ZN∗
∂η˜
=
1
ψη˜2
{
β(1− β)
[
η˜σβ(1− γ)/γ)εβ(LY∗ )
(σ−1)β
] 1
ψ
(B.156)
(σ − 1)
[
η˜σβ(1− γ)/γ)εβ(LY∗ )
(σ−1)β
] δ
ψ
}
, (B.157)
with Ψ = β − (1− β)(σ − 1) + δ(β + (σ − 1)β).
Thus
∂ZS,B
∗
∂η˜
∂ZN
∗
∂η˜
=
1
β
{
η˜0(1− γ)/γ)0(A/B)0(LY∗ )
0
}
=
1
β
. (B.158)
Furthermore
ZS,B∗
ZN∗
=
1 + Ψ∗
β(1 + η˜−1N˜1+δ∗ )
(B.159)
=
η˜(1 + Ψ∗)
β(η˜ + N˜1+δ∗ )
=
1
Ψ∗
+ 1
β( 1Ψ∗ +
N˜1+δ
∗
η˜Ψ∗
)
, (B.160)
with
N˜1+δ∗
η˜Ψ∗
=
[
η˜σβ((1− γ)/γ)εβ(LY∗ )
(σ−1)β
] 1+δ
ψ
η˜((1− γ)/γ)
ε
σ (A/B)
(σ−1)(1−β)
σβ (LY∗ )
σ−1
σ[
η˜σβ(1− γ)/γ)εβ(L˜Y∗ )
(σ−1)β
]− σ−1
σβψ
(B.161)
= η˜0((1− γ)/γ)0(A/B)0(L˜Y∗ )
0 = 1. (B.162)
Thus
ZS,B∗
ZN∗
=
1
Ψ∗
+ 1
β( 1Ψ∗ +
N˜1+δ
∗
η˜Ψ∗
)
=
1
Ψ∗
+ 1
β( 1Ψ∗ + 1)
=
1
β
. (B.163)
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Hence
∂ZS,B
∗
∂η˜
∂ZN
∗
∂η˜
=
ZS,B∗
ZN∗
=
1
β
(B.164)
and
∂ZS,B∗ /Z
N
∗
∂η˜
= 0. (B.165)
ad (c) Proof:
∂ZS,A
∗
ZN
∗
< 0 for some η ∈ (η˜#, η˜##), with η˜## ≤ +∞ and η˜# ≥ η˜crit.
Note that
ZS,A∗
ZN∗
=
ρ
1+ν+ρ (1 + Lˆ∗)
(1− β)
[
1 + η˜ψ˜0Γ
1+δ
ψ (L˜Y∗ )
ψ˜1
] . (B.166)
Thus
∂ZS,A∗ /Z
N
∗
∂η˜
≷ 0, (B.167)
if
∂Lˆ∗
∂η˜
+ η˜ψ˜0Γ
1+δ
ψ (L˜Y∗ )
ψ˜1
[∂Lˆ∗
∂η˜
−
( ψ˜0
η˜
+ ψ˜1
∂L˜Y
∗
∂η˜
LY∗
)
(1 + Lˆ∗)
]
≷ 0. (B.168)
Remember that: ∂Lˆ∗∂η˜ ;
∂L˜Y
∗
∂η˜ < 0 and thus
(
ψ˜0
η˜ + ψ˜1
∂L˜Y
∗
∂η˜
L˜Y
∗
)
≷ 0 and observe that
∂L˜Y
∗
∂η˜
L˜Y∗
=
σ − 1
[1− σ + β(1 + δ)]η˜
(B.169)
ψ1 =
(σ − 1)β(1 + δ)
ψ
(B.170)
ψ0 =
σβ(1 + δ)
ψ
, (B.171)
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such that
ψ˜0
η˜
+ ψ˜1
∂L˜Y
∗
∂η˜
L˜Y∗
=
1
η˜[1− σ + β(1 + δ)]ψ
β(1 + δ)[1− σ + σβ(1 + δ)] (B.172)
=
β(1 + δ)
η˜[1− σ + β(1 + δ)]
. (B.173)
Thus ψ˜0η˜ + ψ˜1
∂L˜Y
∗
∂η˜
L˜Y
∗
< 0, if σ−1β > 1 + δ which requires in our case that δ < 0.4 such that we can
conjecture that ψ˜0η˜ + ψ˜1
∂L˜Y
∗
∂η˜
L˜Y
∗
< 0 is a very likely scenario. A necessary condition for
∂ZS,A
∗
/ZN
∗
∂η˜ > 0
however is that
−
β(1 + δ)(1 + Lˆ∗)
[1− σ + β(1 + δ)]η˜
> −
∂Lˆ∗
∂η˜
. (B.174)
Since limη˜→η˜crit L˜
Y
∗ = +∞ and limη˜→η˜crit ∂˜L
Y
∗ /∂η˜ = −∞, The right-hand side of (B.174) has a
vertical asymptote at η˜ = η˜crit. Moreover, the right-hand side approaches zero as η˜ → ∞. The
left-hand side of (B.174) exhibits a vertical asymptote to the left of η˜crit. As both the left-hand
side and the right-hand side are declining functions in η˜, they must intercept at some η˜# ≥ η˜crit.
Nevertheless it cannot be excluded though that there exists a second intercept at η˜ = η˜## < ∞.
Thus it follow that
∂ZS,A
∗
ZN
∗
< 0 for some η˜ ∈ (η˜#, η˜##), with η˜## ≤ +∞ and η˜# ≥ η˜crit, while could
not verify the existence of η## numerically.
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Figure 1: The structure of the model
(a) (b)
Figure 2: (a) Long-run effects of a change in the teacher-schooling ratio, φ, for δ < 0; (b) Long-run effects
of a change in the teacher-schooling ratio, φ, for δ > 0
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(a) (b)
Figure 3: (a) Long-run effects of a change in relative research productivity, η˜, for δ < 0; (b) Long-run
effects of a change in relative research productivity, η˜, for δ > 0
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions with respect to an increase in the teacher-student ratio, φ.
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